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• ( 1) 
INT·RCDUCTION 
John Locke, father of modern Emciricism, modern 
epistemology end modern psychology, as he has often been 
called, took upon himself the Herculean task of revising 
the theory of thought of his day. 'rlhen he laid down r1is 
pen, a new era was born in the history of philoso:t;::hy, 
namely, epistemology. 1 
Too long had he listened to the extravagant claims 
of the scholastics and rationalists with their blind faith 
in the infallibility of reason. They needed to be challenged. 
Their infellible reasons, out of which they could spin the 
whole universe, needed to be checked. This he sought to do. 
The first step wa.s e refuta.tion of the theory of inne te 
ideas. It is concerning this aspect of Locke's philosophy 
that this thesis is directed. TGe tnesis is a defence of 
Locke both a.gainst those who think he is attacking & straw 
me.n, &.nd also e.gainst those ~Jho hole. tnat Locke denies man 
any innate powers. 
John Locke he.d the preparation of a medice.l men, 
the experience of e statesman, and the soul of a philosopher; 
2 
therefore, he chose the "plain historical method," as ne 
called it, to inquire into the human understanding in e 
manner understandable to all men. This down to earth 
l. Fraser, ECHU, lv. 
2. Locke, ECHU, Introduction, Sect. 2. 
1 
presentation of his analysis of the huma.n understanding 
brought forth the suggestion of his friend, Molyneux, that 
he would do •rell to reorganize his Essay in the schola.stic 
form so that it might better be promoted in the University 
of Dublin. Locke politely declined to do so, preferring 
his own epproach to theirs; and it is interesting to note 
that the "'ssay, in its original form, WE s accepted at Dublin 
and is to this day the only text used on the subject matter 
of the Essay.l His physical life wes limited to tne years 
of 1632-1704, but his spirit moves in halls of great uni-
versities throughout the world even today with tnis singular 
distinction attributed to his famous Essay by Duncan. 11 Next 
to Kant's Criticue of Pure Reason, it lHJ.S been the most 
2 influential single work in modern philosophy." 
1. Bourne, LLL. 
2. Duncan, PVIL, 397. In the light of the effect of the 
political philosophy of Karl l·1erx a.nd Frederick En~:els 
this quotation should be qualified to read 11 in modern 
epistemolo>;y. 11 1-~anifesto of the Communistic Party, 
Chicago: Cherles H. Kerr & Co., 1947. 
ii 
CHAPTER I 
CONCERNING INNATE IDEAS Aim PF.I:'lCIPLES 
The :;::>urpose of this che.pter is to examine Locke 1 s 
polemic sg<'inst innate ideas and principles which occupies 
the First Book of the .O:ssay. In order to set them in clear 
relief it will be best to state the erguments he marsnels 
agsinst inno;te ides.s and principles first (i). Next he 
motives (ii) and the objects or croponents of the theory 
he is attacking (iii) will be analyzed. Fine.lly the valu.e 
of his polemic (iv) will be studied. This will conclude 
Section l of this chapter. 
Section 2 will be devoted to a co~sideration of 
the four typical criticisms of Locke's polemic end their 
answers. The objections used will be tncse of Lord 
Shaftesbury (l), Lee (2) and Leibniz (3). The purpose 
of this chapter will be to evalucte properly Locke's classic 
fignt against innate ideas Rnd principles in the lignt of 
contemporary and present day criticism. 
1. Locke's Polemic Against Innate Ideas and 
Principles 
Innate ideas end principles a.re sometimes referred 
to in the follOl•Jing pa,;,es a.s (1) innateness, (2) innete 
ideas, (3) innate principles and (4) innate knowledge. Innate, 
for Locke, mee.ns th<t the ideas a.nd principles which 
ultimately constitute knowledge are supposed to be held 
1 
consciously or in latency from birth or even before it, in 
every human mind. 
i. The Arguments in Locke's Polemic 
Locke's famous Essay starts with an elaborate attack 
upon innate knowledge. He divides knowledge into speculative 
principles, practical principles and ideas, and sets out 
to demonstrate that they are not innate. It is interesting 
2 
to observe that in the original draft of the Essay he esta.blished 
his empiricism in the main argument and then added a few 
additional paragraphs to meet two possible objections. The 
first is that knowledge may be gained innately. This objection 
is stated and dismissed in one paragraph. However, when he 
came to write the final draft he set apart thirteen sections 
of the Essay for the discussion, which was no longer a 
defense of his system, but an attack upon the theory of 
innate knowledge which had such favor during the seventeenth 
century both on the Continent and in England. The extent 
of this teaching will be discussed in Section iii. 
To introduce the argument Locke refers to 
an ests.blished opinion amongst some men, that there are 
in the understanding certain innate principles; some 
primary notions, Koavo.l E'vvoao.1 , characters as it were 
stamped upon the mind of man; which the soul receives 
in its very first being, and brings into the world 
with it.l · 
Such principles are that what is, is; that a thing does not 
contradict itself; that the whole is greater than its parts, 
1, Locke, ~CHU, I.II.I. (In Fraser I.I.I., Cf. Bibliography, 
page 1.) 
and so on. Tne first argument adduced for t.ne inncteness 
of knowledge of tnese and the like principles is that we 
all agree about them. To this Locke replies that, in the 
first place, universal agreement in itself is no proof of 
innateness but only self-evidence which is necessary for 
knowledge, and, in tne second place, not all people, strictly 
speaking, do agree about these principles. In fact, a 
large part of mankind has never once conceived them. Yet 
if they were truly innate, 1 stamped upon the mind 1 , they 
would be in the thoughts of every human being from birth. 
But tney are not, for children and. m?.ny a.dults know nothing 
1 
of them. Where, then, is the evidence for innate ideas 
and principles? 
At this point some said that we ere ell at lea.st 
potentially capable of knowing these principles for vJe nave 
the cepecity to know them. To this Locke vJould say 1 then 
you do not believe in innate princinles, but, rather innete 
capacities; end in addition you believe everything is 
inne .. te •. He reedily accepts loc;ice.l structure of the 
mind end utterly rejects the stocking of tne mind before 
sensa.tion or reflection with principles or iaees. This is 
eviuenced by his note on the ffiE\rt;in of Thoma.s BtJ.rnet 1 s 
pamphlet ••herein the suthor esked if Locke 11 allm.rs for any 
powers to be innste to mankind. 11 Locke jotted down 'I think 
nobody but t.,is author who ever reed my book could doubt 
that I spoke only of innate ideas; fer my subject oJSS the 
1. Freser, ECHU, I. I. 2f. 
understa.nding, and not of innate powers.'1 What Fraser 
says about this is the unfortunate truth: 
Locke never askes, as Kant afterwards did, what this 
'capacity', which he allows to be latent or innate, 
necessarily implies.2 
Some have objected that innate principles only mean 
that the propositions axe in our minds implicitly, but not 
yet expl1ci tly. To this Locke replies "No proposition can 
be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it 
was never yet conscious of. 113 Others have said that it means 
that we will know these principles when we come to reason. 
Locke answers that we shall also know that seven and five 
are twelve when we come to reason, but no one supposes this 
to be innate knowledge. Moreover, he adds, it is not by 
reasoning that we know these principles, though we use them 
in reasoning. For: 
those who will take the pains to reflect with a little 
attention on the operations of the understanding will 
find that this ready assent of the mind to some truths 
depends not either on native inscription, or the use 
of reason; but on a faculty of the mind quite4distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. 
The alternative is intuition as he later points out. 
After rejecting the universal consent claim, he turns 
to the question of such knowledge being prior in time. 
Clearly the knowledge of principles, abstract ~sit is, comes 
late. Sensation, recognition, seeing that red is not white, 
1. Fraser, ECHU, xliv. 
2. Locke, ECHU, 4l n.l. 
~·. Locke, ECHU, I.II.5. 




are all prior to our knowledge of the principle of non-
contradiction, It is strange that the last, none the less, 
should be singled out as a 'native inscription 1 • 
He then turns to logical necessity, for some say 
the principles are logically necessary and self-evident. It 
is maintained that once we understand what the words in the 
proposition mea.n we must see it to be true. This they then 
use to hold to innate principles for they urge such self-
evidence can only be explained ·in this manner, ·since 
knowledge of them is quite out of the ordinary and never 
acquired as other knowledge is. To this Locke replies that 
without question the principles are self-evident, but Just 
because tney carry their 1 own light and evidence 1 >vi th them 
it is superfulous to suppose them innate. Furthermore so 
also are many other truths not usually regarded as innate, 
for instance, mathematical truths. Either these matheraa.tical 
truths are also innate or self-evidence in itself is no 
proof of innateness. The principle 'What is, is 1 is necessary 
not because it was innate, but because the consideration 
of the nature of the things cont~ined in those words 
would not suffer him Lthe knower) to think otherwisi' 
how or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. 
In other words, however necessary and self-evident such 
principles are, Locke can see no argument in this fact for 
their being innate. Against self-evidence, Locke has no 
1. Locke, ECHU, I. II. 21. 
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grievance, in fact he readily avows its necessity for 
rationality, The criterion of self-evidence is intuition. 
This raises the rroblem of how Locke distinguishes, if he 
does, between innateness and intuition, which will be one 
of the main considerations of Chapter Two. 
Lock:e turns from speculative to pra.ctical principles 
and asks again if there are any practical principles about 
which we are all agreed. There are certain tendencies common 
to all such as 11 as desire of happiness and an aversion to 
misery, 11 but 11 these are inclinations of the appetite to 
good, not impressions of truth on the understanding. ul 
As to moral principles as such, there is more agreement 
about speculative principles than about the former; and he 
has already shown the latter to be without universal agree-
ment. That there are eternal, immutable le.ws of morality 
established by God, he unhesitatingly admits; but that they 
are known by a mysterious, innate knowledge, he unequivocably 
rejects. Fraser here comments: 
moral obligation, which is eternal and grounded on 
reason, is thus distinguished from the contingency of 
an individual recognition of, and conformity to, wha.t 
is in itself thus obligatory. In what follows it only 
appears that men are not actually as good as they ought 
to be. His argument is, that immoral practice without 
reproach of conscience proves that the law transgre~sed 
cannot be innate, or consciously ack:nowledge by all. 
Surely, if all men knew the eternal moral principles we should 
not have the spectacle of whole nations breaking one or 
1. Locke, ECHU, I.III.3. 
2. Fraser, ECdU, 70,n.2. 
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more of them and showing no shame in doing so as if they 
were wholly unaware of them. At this point it is clearly 
seen how easy it was for Locke to refute the five practical 
principles innately known to all which Lord Herbert listed 
in his book De Veritate. 1 
Locke turns now to some further considerations in 
relation both to speculative and practical principles to 
show that if such principles are innate, the ideas out of 
which the principles are formed should also be innate. But 
they are obviously not. 
If the ideas which made up those truths ~1ere not, it 
was impossible that the propositions made up of them 
should be innate. For, if the ideas be not innate, 
there was a time when the mind l~as without these 
principles; and then they will not be innate, but 
derived from some other origine_l. For, where the ideas 
themselves are not, there can be no knowledg2, no assent, 
no mental or verbal propositions about them. 
The princiDle 1 it is impossible for the sa_me thing to be 
a,nd not to be 1 is taken to be innate by upholders of innate 
principles. But are impossibility and identity innate ideas? 
As for identity there is a grea,t variety of meaning ascribed 
to the term by learned ~en, but this cannot be if the idea 
1 identity 1 is innate. And if the idea 'identity' is not 
innate, then, Locke insists, neither can the principle 'it 
is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be' be 
"' innate.  Furthermore, if agreement were reached it ~~ould 
only prove self-evidence, not innateness. 
1. Cf. Rand's edition of the Essay, xxi-xxii. 
2. Locke, ECHU, I.IV.I. 
3. Locke, ECHU, I.IV.I. 
8 
The practical principles, likewise, contain ideas 
which cannot possibly be innate, e.g., Locke says; 
That God is to be worshipped, is, without doubt, as 
great a truth as any that can enter into the mind of 
man, and deserves the first place amongst all practica.l 
princi?les. But yet it can by no means be thought 
innate, unless the ideas of God and 1vorship are innate. 
That the idea the term worship stands for, •.. is not 
sta.mped on the mind in its first original, I think will 
be easily granted, by any one that considers how few 
there be amongst gro~~ men who have a clear and distinct 
notion of it.I 
Fraser, in his edition of the Essay identifies this as one 
of Lord Herbert's innate principles. 2 In the next section 
Locke raised the question of the inne.teness of the idea of 
God and shows how individual men and nations of men seem 
never once to heve conceived the idea of God. And among 
. . . . 
those who heve a conc)3ption of God there is great disagreement 
as to th~ nature of the conception. He cannot understand 
how there could be so many contradictory conceptions in the 
minds of men, if one God put them there innately. Noreover, 
if there is no innate idea of God, it is unlikely we have 
innate ideas of anything else for it above all others should 
be innate. Then if there are no innate ideas there can be 
no innate principles e.nd the doctrine is wholly discredited. 
Why do man persist in holding to the doctrine of 
innate ideas and principles? The ane~rer must be, Locke 
informs us, that it gives a show of authority and fina.lity 
1. Locke, ECRU, I.IV.7. 
2. Fraser, ECHU, vel. 1,95,n.2. 
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which teachers and preachers can put to effective use. The 
doctrine eased the lazy from the pains of search and stopped 
the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all tbat was once 
styled innate. It was of no small advantage to those who 
affected to be masters and teachers, to make this the princi-
ple of principles--that principles must not be questioned. 
For once having established this tenet it put their followers 
under necessity to receive some doctrines as such, much the 
same as granting invalid premises and being forced to accept 
, 
the conclusion ..... The doctrine of innate ideas and principles 
is then seen in its true light as a hindrance to philosophy 
and theology because of its obscurantism. The first step 
in the theory of knowledge, for Locke, is an emphatic denial 
of innate ideas in order to make way for his appeal to "men's 
own unprejudiced experience and observation." 2 
In order to make the whole matter clear it is necessary 
to state precisely what Locke is, and what he is not, denying. 
To begin with, he is not denying prenatal experience. That 
he recognizes a child may experience hunger and warmth before 
birth is obvious from these words: 
therefore I doubt not but children, by the exercise 
of their senses about objects tha.t affect them in the 
womb, receive some few ideas before they are born • . 
amongst which I think the ideas of hunger and warmth 
are two. Yet these simple ideas are far from those 
innate principles • . • being the effects sf sensation, 
and only from some affections of the body. 
1. Locke, ECHU, I.IV.24. 
2. Locke, ECHU, I.IV.26. 
3. Locke, ECHU, II.IX.5. 
9 
But such experience is not different in kind from the post-
natal experience of feeling hungry. Nor does Locke deny 
what are designated innate dispositions today. He nowhere 
discusses such things as instincts, reflexes and tropisms. 
Fraser informs us concerning a discussion between Locke and 
Pierre Coste who suggested to the former that he might 
explain instinctive knowledge in animal life to the benefit 
of his system. To which Locke replied, "Je n 1ai oas ecrit 
men livre pour expliquer les actions des betes.nl The 
theory of innate knowledge was meant to explain cognition 
at its highest and best, something far beyond the reach of 
animals. Indeed, it was just because this cognition was 
thought so excellent that it was necessary to introduce a 
fresh, non-natural faculty, pertaining to the inner essence 
of the soul of man, in order to explain it. 
A serious misunderstanding of Locke's system has 
arisen at this point which has caused unnecessary criticism 
of the system. It is trequently assumed that Locke's denial 
of innate knowledge is equivalent to the assertion that the 
one kind of knowledge which exists is sensory, limited to 
the five senses. He holds that all knowledge is acquired 
and none innate, but by acquired knowledge he is wrongly 
assumed to mean sense-experience, and nothing more. The 
outcome of the polemic against innate ideas according to 
this view is a pure sensationalism. To call Locke a sensa-
tionalist is about as intelligent as calling an idealist a. 
1. Locke, ECHU, (ed. Fraser), vel. I,205,n.2. 
10 
solipsist because of e.n improper evaluation of idealism. 
There is nothing in the text to justify the use of the 
term sensationalist for the writer of the Essay, On the 
contrary, when he talks of our knowledge of the speculative 
principles in the course of the argument he obviously does 
not mean that this knowledge is sensory in the narrow sense 
explained a.bove. From the context it is quite clear that 
he has something like the intuition of Book IV1 in mind. 
Although this theory of knowledge is not at all explicit 
in Book I, still it is clearly not contradictory of the 
theory in Book IV. A further development of this discussion 
will be found in vlebb 1 s Intellectualism of Locke. 
All knowledge is a.cquired. The three instances of 
knowledge are (1) intuition (e.g., knowledge of ourselves), 
(2) demonstration (e.g., knowledge of God), (3) sensitive 
knowledge (e.g., Knowledge of external objects). These are 
all certain knowledge. 
To sum up this discussion we can say that the polemic 
establishes two points. First, we ought not to talk of 
truths known innately unless we are prepared to go the whole 
way and accept the view that a child at birth knows the 
principle of identity. In other words, we ought not to use 
the term innate knowledge unless we mean actual knowledge 
in the strict sense. It has a plain meaning in English, 
and if we do not mean this we ought to use some other term. 
l. Locke, ECHU, IV.XVII.l4. 
11 
If, on the other hand, we are prepared to go the whole way, 
then Locke thinks our position is absurd, and in this he 
is surely Justified. Second, we can explain all the knowl-
edge the human mind ever gains in terms of sensation, 
intuition, and demonstration. Beyond these no appeal is 
ever necessary or even possible, so far as concerns human 
knowledge. A further type of knowledge, namely, innate 
knowledge, is superfluous. 
A final problem concerning Book One is the question 
of whether this is equivalent to a denial of the a priori 
in general. It should be said to begin with that this term 
a priori knowledge, which Locke never uses himself, is 
ambiguous, so much so that it is possible to assert that 
Locke both denies and asserts a priori knowledge. If we 
mean by it a knowing of principles whereby we order exper-
ience, a knowing which is logically prior to that experience 
itself, then Locke emphatica.lly denies such knowing. The 
only principles which Locke recognizes are the necessary 
relations between ideas. Tllese are disclosed in experience. 
On the other hand, if ~re mean by a priori knowledge a knowl-
edge having an object, that carries with it universality and 
necessity, then Locke acknowledges the possibility of a 
priori knowledge. But the universality and necessity are 
in no sense inherent in the knowing mind, they are 
chaxacterisitcs of that which is discovered. Thus Locke 
in denying innate knowledge is not denying the a priori in 
this second sense. 
12 
• 
In concluding the first section of this Chapter it 
11ill perhaps lend lucidity to recapitulate in order to 
determine what Locke means by innateness, what it involves, 
and what it should not be confounded with. 
inborn. 
First, by the term innate, Locke means something 
He assumes as an incontrovertible fact that all 
human beings are born w.tth innate intelligence, i.e., the 
powers to perceive, think, doubt, believe, reason, know, 
1 
and will. In never questioning or analyzing these powers, 
he left a void in his system; but in his silence he affirmed 
his faith in the innateness of intelligence. 
Second, he objected sharply to the illegitimate use, 
as he saw it, of the legitimate word innate in connection 
with the terms ideas and/or principles, which in that 
context implied, for him, mental content. He could not 
conceiVe of an idea or principle devoid of content, and, 
therefore, he attacked what he said was the established 
opinion in his day. 2 
Third, he admitted the existence of self-evident 
propositions which the mind, upon knowing the meaning of 
immediately accepted, without which there could be no 
certainty of knowledge. Nevertheless, this self-evidence, 
he insisted, must not be confounded with innateness of the 
1. Locke, ECHU, II.I.4. 
2. Locke, ECHU, I.I.I. 
13 
proposition; for certain self-evident propositions remain 
~hknown to many persons thro~gho~t their lifetime, which 
wo~ld make the ~se of the term innate, in this context, 
meaningless. 
Th~s far, Locke has only drawn a line of cleavage 
between innste fac~lties which he affirms, and innate knowl-
edge which he rejects. What the innate faculties are will 
be a problem of the Second Chapter. A consideration of the 
motive of his polemic is now in order. 
ii. The Motives of Locke's Polemic 
Locke was dist~rbed by the teaching of innate ideas 
and principles in his day. Too often, especially in its 
application to the theological and practical q~estion, it 
only replaced the appeal to the authority of Aristotle a.nd 
the form~lated dogmas of the Church. The net~ 11 a~thori ty" was 
obtained by general agreement which was s~pposed to be 
~niversal agreement, b~t was in practice eq~ivalent to the 
a~thority of c~rent opinions and ecclesiastical prej~dices. 
He objected to innate ideas and principles for three reasons. 
First, it gave a f alee acco ~nt of the nat~re and source of 
certsinty. By seeking to rest the certainty of its first 
principles ~pon the extraneo~s s~pport of an incomprehensible 
matter of fact, and by its acceptance of ~niversal consent 
as the ~ltimate criterion of tr~th, it violated his f~nda­
mental conviction, that tr~th must make good its claim by 
an appeal to the intellectual faculties of the individual. 
14 
\~ 
It regarded all reasoning as a process of subsumption, in 
which any particular truth is proved by being deduced from 
certain ultimate premises or so-called 'principles', which 
are, therefore, the foundation of all other knowledge. 
These principles are not themselves susceptible to proof 
but must be accepted on their own evidence and are supposed 
to be guar1mteed by the 1 universal assent 1 accorded to them. 
But self-evidence limited in this way to a specific number 
of propositions easily assumes a mystical quality. Their 
certa.inty is regarded as due, not to the simple insight of 
reason, but to the a.ction of nature or of God, imprinting 
them upon the mind at its first being. And this in turn is 
taken to explain the universal agreement of mankind about 
them. The defense of innate principles was in his mind 
closely connected with the abuse of maxims, and the me of 
faulty methods of demonstration. 
Second, it served as an encouragement to the greatest 
of all hindrances to knowledge, the lazy acquiescence in the 
opinions of others, by which men avoid the trouble and 
exertion involved in the right use of their intellectual 
powers. Throughout the discussion Locke opposes the theory 
of innateness with the view that knowledge is only to be 
won by the active employment of our faculties, in 'the 
consideration of things. 1 It is only by this means that we 
can distinguish the evidence of truth from the mere influence 
of irrational custom. Without this labor the characteristics 
15 
\\o 
of genuine knowledge are wanting, even though our assent may 
be given to that which is in itself true. As Locke says, 
The floating of other men's opinions in our brains 
makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they 
happen to be true. What in them was science is in 
us but opinia.try .1 
Concerning this Gibson says, 
In thif' insistence upon the necessity for an active 
appropr:iat1on· of truth by the individual, we have, 
I believe, the deepest motive of Locke's polemic.2 
In this is visible a foreshadowing of Kant's activity 
of mind in knowledge. 
Third, he considers that the theory of innate 
principles stands in direct conflict with the manner and order 
in which experience shows that ideas first occur in conscious-
ness. He emphatically challenged the upholders of this 
theory because he could show that all our ideas can be 
traced bac~ to an origin in experience. This being the 
case, innate principles merely confused thinking. If Locke 
was right 11 that all our knowledge begins with experience" 
and Kant later seemed to think so,~ then there was no advantage 
in talking about innate principles; so he set about to drive 
them out of philosophical a.nd theological language, which 
he succeeded in doing. 4 Alexander's statement--
1. Locke, ECHU, I.4.23. 
2. Gibson, LTOK, 37. 
3. Locke, ECHU (ed. Pringle-Pattison), xxx. 
4. Locke, ECHU (ed. Pringle-Pattison), xxxvi. 
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it is therefore not strange, that the attack upon 
inna.te ideas should have come to be that part of 
Locke's teaching which the public connected habitu-
ally with his name--1 
is readily understood. He was clearing the ground to lay 
a foundation for certainty which would not be dependent 
upon faulty methods of demonstration. It is interesting 
to note that in the Abstract of the Essay which he wrote 
himself, he does not include the polemic even in abridgement. 
He explains, 
that Lthe polemi£7 being only to remove the prejudice 
that lies in some men's minds, I think it best in this 
short view I design here of my principles, to pass by 
all that preliminary debate which makes the first book, 
since I pretend to show in what follows the original 
from whence, and the ways whereby, we receive all the 
ideas our understandings are employed about in thinking.2 
The primary motive, then, according to the author is to 
remove prejudice s.nd prepare the way for his theory of 
knowledge. 
iii. The Objects of Locke's Polemic 
Since the sixteenth century the authority of both 
Aristotle and the Church had become a. source of dispute. 
Men were now grasping for e. recognized starting point. This 
they found in the theory of natural or inna.te principles 
upon which those who differed most in other respects often 
found themselves in substantial agreement. It is well known 
that inna.te ideas occupied a prominent po8ition in the 
philosophy of Descartes; while in England innate principles 
1. Alexander, L, 57. 
2. King, LLL, 367. Cf'. Aaron, itCHU-;A, 97, App;ii. 
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were proclaimed by almost all of those who were seeking to 
find a rational basis for knowledge and conduct. To establish 
the existence of innate ideas or principles in the 1-1ritings 
of Locke's day is not difficult, perhaps one quotation from 
Descartes will illustrate sufficiently. 
I ' h -" Entre ces idees, les unes me semblent etre nees 
avec moi, les autres ftre Hrangeree et venir de 
dehors, er les autres €ire faites et inventtes par 
moi-m~me. 
To establish agreement among the advocates of innate ideas 
or principles as to the nature of them, is the problem at 
this point; for they had no list of them2 and no foundation 
'2 
~ for them except universal a.greement. They were universally 
admitted, therefore innate; innate, therefore certain and 
beyond the reach of criticism. There seem to be only two 
possible definitions: ( 1) innate principles are explicitly 
possessed from the earliest dawn of consciousness and (2) 
innate principles are latent in the mind. These were said 
by Locke to be the established opinion in his day for: 
there is nothing more commonly ta.ken for granted than 
that there are certain principles, both speculative 
and practical, (for they speak of both), universally 
agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they argue, 
must needs be the constant impressions 1-1hich the souls 
of men receive in their first beings, and ;.1hich they 
bring into the world with them, as necessarily and 
really as they do any of their inherent faculties. 4 
1. Descartes, ii,ed., itL7. 
2. Locke, ECHU, 1,2,14. 
3. Locke, ECHU, I,2,2. 
4. Locke, ECHU, I.II.2. 
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But some to avoid the obvious difficulties of the cruder 
theory, reply: 
a.ll men know and assent to them, when they come to 
the use of rea.son; and this is enough to prove them 
innate.I 
Against these two definitions of innate ideas and principles 
John Locke set himself as a crusader, for: 
an 'innate idea' is with Locke an idea consciously 
possessed, independently of any experience, and without 
any need for an a.cti ve exercise of the understanding 
among the data of experience in order to its attainment. 
"Whatever idea2is in the mind, the mind must be conscious of. 11 
And a principle which is made up of ideas which are not 
innate ca.nnot itself be considered innate according to Locke. 
Now the question arises as to whom Locke addressed 
himself in his polemic. Lord Herbert of Cherbury is the 
only writer he refers to by name,3 therefore our conclusions 
must rest on inference. There have been put forth five 
suggestions as the objects of Locke's attack. Tney are 
Rene Descartes, the Cartesians, certain members of the 
Cambridge Platonists, Lord Herbert and the Scholastics. 
However, there a.re difficulties with each one of these. 
Fraser says "from the first, Descartes, with whose 
writing he w<:s ea.rly familiar, was probably in hi·s view. 114 
Alexander agrees with Fraser. 5 But if this is the case the 
1. Locke, ECHU, I.II.6. 
2. Fraser, EC}U, lxxi. 
3. Locke, E8HU, I.III.l5. 
4. Fraser, ECHU, 37. n .1. 
5. Alexander, LOC, 56. 
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following words of Fraser seem to set Locke's arguments on 
edge. 
The 11d!les n~es avec mo1 1 of Descartes were not regarded 
by him as in consciousness until 'experience' had evoked 
them from latency--a P£Sit1on which Locke's argument 
always fails to reach. 
And Veitch adds: 
the moment the doctrine of Descartes is thus correctly 
apprehended, the whole polemic of Locke against'~Innate 
Ideas" is seen to be irrelevant. If the doctrine is to 
be validly assailed against, it :nus~ be on wholly other 
grounds than those stated by Locke. 
But this attempt to shovl that Locke was not thinl~ing of 
Descarte& is a new approach, for according to Aaron 
the traditional answer accepted by all until tbe 
middle and end of the nineteenth century was that 
Descartes and the Csrtesians were being attacked. But 
when scholars come to realize Locke's own debt to 
Descartes and rediscovered the rationalist elements 
in his writings, and when they examined Descartes 
on innate ideas more close~y, they felt that this 
answer was unsatisfactory. 
The netf trend was, to deny that Locke was thinking of 
Descartes and his followers; but this made the problem 
more vexing ths.n ever, and produced great confusion on the 
subject. This prompted some critics to ta.ke a racUcal 
view and, as Aaron says: 
it has been seriously suggest by some writers that 
Locke, in order to make his own views claarer, began 
by setting up a man of straw, presenting in a concrete 
and vivid fashion a theory of knowledge which no 
1. Fraser, ECHU, 37. 
2. Descartes, 141\IP (ed. Vel tch), lxxvi. 
3. Aaron, JL, 75-6. 
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philosopher had ever actually upheld, and refuting 
it convincingly. I find it hard to accept the 
suggestion. The references to 'these men of innate 
principles' in the text are of such a kind that they 
seem to me to rule out this hypothesis. !•!ore over, 
Locke 1o1as not the rna£ to waste power and shot on 
imaginary opponents. 
This seems to be the more reasona.ble position to hold, for 
it was held by no less a thinker than Leibniz, who in his 
Nouveaux Essais of 1703 connected Locke with the Gassendists 
as one of the most eminent protagonists of the Cartesians. 
And it was at this precise point of dispute, i.e., innate 
ideas. Leibniz, speaking through Philalethes, says--
He LLockil writes obviously in the spirit of Gassendi, 
which is at the bottom that of Democritus. He believes 
. • . that there are no innate ideas, that our mind is 
a tabula rasa, and that we do not always think and he 
appears disposed to approve of most of the objections 
which Gassendi has made to Descartes. He has enriched 
and strengthened this system by a thousand beautiful 
reflections; and I do not at all doubt that now our 
part will triumph boldly over it~ adversaires, the 
Peripatetics and the Cartesians.2 
Add to this the witness of Voltaire, who in his, Lettres 
Philosophigues praises Locke's eminently successful attack 
upon Descartes' impossible view, as follows: 
He LDescarteil was certain that we always think and 
that the soul arrives in the body ready-provided with 
all metaphysical notions, knowing God, space, infinity, 
possessing all the abstract ideas and filled with fine 
thoughts, which ~t unfortunately forgets when the body 
leaves the womb. 
Thus, the prince of learned men in the generation after 
1. Aaron, JL, ?6. 
2. Leigniz, NE. 
3. Voltaire, OC, Sec. 2,600, 
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Leibniz had no doQbt whatever that Locke's attack was 
meant for Descartes. 
Santayana, in our generation, too saw this and said: 
Very chare.cteristic was the tireless polemic which Locke 
carried on against Descartes. The outraged plain facts 
had to be defended a~ainst sweeping and arbitrary theories. 
There were no innate ideas or maxims: children were not 
born murmering that things equal to the same thing were 
equal to one another; and an urchin knew that pain was 
caused by the parental slipper before he reflected1 philosophically that everything must have a cause. 
But how could Leibniz and Voltaire hold to this and at the 
same time properly understand Descartes? 
It must be admitted by all~udents of Descartes 
that his system suffered from ambiguity, at certain points, 
which Locke sorely lamented about philosophers, but while 
he was writing this criticism he was indulging in the same 
thing. This is not hard to understand. These men were 
pioneers. Still, the ambiguities made for confusion, and 
as Fowler says: 
It must be confessed, however, that in his better-·· 
known works he often employs unguarded and unexplained 
express~ons which might2easily suggest the crude form of the a priori theory. 
A further point to establish the fact that Descartes 
had left himself open to Locke's attack, is an incident 
which occurred before Locke's day. After the publication 
of Descartes' Meditations, Reguis3 accused him of teaching 
that prenatal infants have the notion of God. To answer 
this Descartes wrote his Notes against a Programme, in which 
1. Santayana, TTMF, 29f. 
2. Fowler, JL, ~37. 
3. Fraser, ECHU, lxxii. 
he stated that he never wrote or concluded that the mind 
required innate ideas which were in some sort different from 
its fe.ulty of thinking. However, the narm was done--he 
had not TJB.de himself clear enough concerning inna.te ideas 
but what a critic accused him of holding tnat infants, 
before birth had alre~dy, the notion of God. 
But if Descartes did not mean tha•t children were 
born into the world with ideas already i:nplanted in tneir 
minds, what did he mean? Aaron finds only two possibilities 
from a careful study of Descartes' works. 
He LDescl3.rtei/ seems to ha.ve meant sometiiT'es this, 
that we have · n inn&te faculty c·f knowing which he 
identifies with thinking. If he meant this then Locke 
would agree with him, for the iatter admits • • . the 
existence of innate faculties. 
But secondly Descartes 
seems to have meant that we are beings prone, as it 
were, to think in certain fixed weys and according to 
certein 1 germs of thought 1 in the mind innately, 
though not in the sense that the cnild is explicitly 
at;are of these germs in its mother's womb. Tne 
necessity and universality of these truths itself 
SU('gested some such vie1-1 to Descartes. This view Locke 
attacked. He does not deny the element of necessity 
in such truths, but he does deny that this is an argu-
ment for cell inc: them innate in en v sense, even if ell 
we mean to say is thet we do not gain such trutns in 
tne same way ss we gain other truths. It is frequently 
forgotten thct Locke does atta.ck t,:is2view of innate kno1v1e dr.se as 1iJell as the cruder kind. 
In this latter sense, alone, Locke had grounds for thinking 
of Descartes as he formulated nis polemic, but to labor the 
1. Aaron, JL, 79. 
2. Ae.ron, JL, 79. 
23 
24 
problem a bit more, the question might be asked--did Descartes 
ever approach the crude theory of innate ideas in his writings? 
Voltaire and others, as was observed above, thought this to 
be the case. 
Gassendi wrote, in criticism of Descartes, that he 
found it difficult to believe the latter's theory(that the 
mind is always thinking and particularly that the mind had 
thoughts in the womb)for lack of evidence. This led him to 
doubt innate thoughts and ideas. In reply to Gassendi, 
Descartes does not object to the former's attributing to him 
the view that the mind has thoughts in the womb, but apparently 
acquiesces in it. This is obvious from Descartes' reply to 
Gassendi. 
You have a difficulty, however, you say as to whether 
I think that the soul always thinks. But why should 
it not alwa.ys think, when it is a thinking sub~:~tance? 
Why is it strange that we do not remember the thoughts 
it has had when in the womb or in a stupor, when we do 
not even remember the most of those we know we heve had 
when grown up in good health, and a.wake?l 
It is true that perhaps all Descartes meant here was such 
prenatal experiences as hunger or cold, which Locke himself 
admits, but Aaron objects that 
there is nothing to show that he had such experiences 
in mind, and the word cogitationes which he used here 
(tre.nslated 'thoughts•) is more suggestive of Voltaire's 
belles connaissances than of prenatal experiences such 
as hunger. The passage does seem to provide a possible 
foundation, at least, for the theory of innate ideas in 
the crudest form, and his opponents can hardly be blamed 
for assuming that Descartes was committed to it. 2 
1. Descartes, PW, 115. 
2. Aaron, JL, 80-81. 
It may also be said here that other members of the Cartesian 
school, with whom Locke is said to have had company for 
several years, probably were more definite in their statements 
of the theory. From this consideration Aaron argues that 
Locke 
came away with the impression that some of the Cartesians 
(and perhaps Descartes himself) on occasion did hold 
that we are born knowing certain truths, and he attacked 
this view, He also realized, of course, that this was 
not the only form of the argument, that the theory of 
innate ideas was being put forward in addition as a 
very vague explanation of necPssity and universality, 
and he pays attention (though. insufficient attention) 
to this further aspect of the theory. Thus there is 
very substantial evidence in support of the view that 
Locke was attacking Desce~tes and the Cartesians.l 
Additional weight is added to this argument by the 
statement of Gibson that 
against both forms of the theory, as held by Descartes, 
the principle that 'to be in the understanding is to be 
understood' applied with overwhelming effect, since it 
cannot be evaded by one who accepts the Cartesian view 
that the2essence of mind consists in self-conscious thought. 
Also: 
the contrast which we find in the Essay between innate 
and 'adventitious' ideas seems to be directl:( drawn 
from the first form of the Cartesian theory.v 
Fraser, in his comment concerning the Cartesian 
habit of equating actual thinking with the essence of the 
soul, also holds the followers of Descartes to be the object 
of Locke's attack. 
1. Aaron, JL, 81. 
2. Gibson, LTOK, 231. 
3. Ibid. 
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The Cartesians are here immediately in view, with tbeir 
a priori maxim as to the essence of the soul, according 
to which its very existence consists in actual conscious-
ness, so that, if consciousness were interrupted, it 
would necessarily cease to exist,l 
Thus the inevitable conclusion forces itself upon us--that 
Locke's polemic was meant for the Cartesians, but it may now 
be inq~ired, were they the sole obJects in the mind of the 
polemicist? The answer must be given in the negative. 
There were some Cambridge Platonists who held to the 
doctrine of innate idea.s. Henry Lee thought that Locke was 
without a. legitimate basis in hie argument against innate 
ideas. He says in his chapter by chapter criticism of the 
Essay, Anti-Scepticism, "all \,rhich I think might have been 
saved, in the strict sense which he LLockil puts upon the 
2 
word innate; for therein surely he has no adversary." But 
Locke's polemic was not confined to the crude form, despite 
the fact that most critics refer to it only in this form. 
It was, nonetheless, held by some Cambridge Flatonists that 
it was necessary to posit some sort of innate knowledge of 
God, and vague though it ma.y have been, it Nas a popular 
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doctrine in their day. For exs.mple Henry Hare in his Antidote 
Against Atheism (1653) lists what he considers to be innate 
speculative principles; and these a.re the very ones which 
Locke attacks in the third chapter of his First Book. 
l. Fraser, ECHU, l28.n.l. 
2. Lee, AS, b. 
However, to return to the consideration of the crude form 
of the doctrine, i.e., innate mental content, Webb in his 
excellent volume, The Intellectualism of Locke, finds that 
the crude form of the doctrine 
was the only theory by which the highest Schools of 
speculation in the ancient world could a.ccount for the 
existence of our ~ priori Concepts. So in the principles 
of the Pythagorean Philosophy, that Pythagoras professed 
actually to remember the events of his antenatal life. 
So completely did it interpenetrate the Philosophy of 
Plato, that Plato denominated Philosophy itself by no 
other name than that of Reminiscence. Nor was this 
expression of Plato a mere metaphor. In the Tusculan 
Disputations the Roman orator reproduces the arguments 
of the Ple.tonic Socre.tes as enounced in the Meno and 
the Phaedp and proclaims the d~ctrine of Pre-existent 
Ideas to be a necessary truth. 
This certainly sounds like those of whom Locke spoke in these 
words: 
it is an established opinion among some ~en that there 
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are in the Understanding certain Innste Principles--
some Primary Notions, K.oiY'tJ-1 'tvY'oiQ.I~ Characters, as it 
were stamped upon the Mind of man, which the soul receives 
in its very first being, and brings into the •10rld with 
it.2 
\'lebb continues the argument by saying: 
Nor were these ancient speculations alien from the 
spirit of modern thought. The Philosophy that 
superseded Scholasticism was, in fact, essentially 
Flatonic3. • •• [for examply Sixteen years before 
Locke's first appea.rance as a Philosopher, Cumberland, 
in the Prolegomena to his celebrated work against the 
Philosophy of Hobbes, speaks of the Platonic theory 
of Innate Ideas as the accredited doctrine of the 
Platonists of the day.4 
1. Webb, IL, 45. 
2. Locke, ECRU, I.II.l. 
3. Webb, IL, 46. 
4. Webb, IL, 50, 
From the above considerations we conclude tha.t tne 
Cambridge Poatonists offered Locke sufficient grounds on 
which to base ,-Jis two-fold polemic. 
Then there were those teachers in the universities 
who still followed the narrow scholastic tradition in hold-
ing that knowledge begins with 'maxims' from which we deduce 
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other truths syllogistically. These maxims were above doubt, 
for they were known intuitively. Locke admitted that they 
were self-evident and known by intuition, but this does not 
constitute their being innate. He objects that it was the 
beaten road of the schools to lay down principles as the 
beginning from which we must set out and look no further 
1 backwards in our enquiries. The argument is not confined 
to Book I f'or Locke takes the mexims "whatsoever is, is 11 
and 11 It is im~ossible for the same thing to be and not to 
be, 11 which are the foundations of a.ll knowled~:e and shows 
thet they ere the same principles whose self-evidence he 
9 
a.ffirms and innateness he clcnies in Chapter r.- Gibson attests 
to the correctness of the view that Locke included the 
scholastics in his polemic. 
If~e opponents are the upholders of maxims of Book 
IV, his designations of the latter leave no room for 
doubt as to whom he had in mind. It was the 1Scholsstic 1 
men who indulged in a 'great deal of talk' about . 
'sciences' and the maxims on which they are built.8 
1. Locke, ECHU, xxi f. 
3 .. Gibson, LTOK, 42. 
2. Locke, ECHU, VI.VI.l-4. 
Finally Lord Herbert presented a good basis for 
Locke's argumentation. Though indeed he acknowledges that 
11 common notions 11 lEi is equivalent for £ prior principle.!!l 
require an object to elicit them into consciousness, Fowler 
observes that, 11 he seems invariably to regard them ready-
made ideas implanted in the human mind from its very origin. 111 
They are found in every man, and universal consent is the 
main criterion by which they are to be discriminated. They 
are given by an independent faculty, Natural Instinct, which 
is to be distinguished from Internal Sense, External Sense, 
and reasoning, the sources of our other ideas. Rand agrees 
with this decision. 
Before resuming his enquiry, he LLock£7 had been 
informed that Lord Herbert of Cherbury in his work 
De Veritate had discussed innate principles and given 
what he regards as six marks of their engraven 
che.racter on the minds of men. The refutation of such 
marks is later reproduced al1lost verbs.tim in the final 
text of the 11 Essay. 112 
Aaron gives us this concluding paragraph: 
The conclusion to which 1ve seem driven, then, is that 
Locke's polemic was meant for the Cartesians, for the 
schoolmen, for certain members of the Cambridge Platonists, 
and for those others, Herbert and the ~est, who advocated 
the theory of innate ideas in any way.~ 
2. Conclusions 
The preceeding discussion resolves itseif into this 
question--was Locke attacking, in his First Book explicitly 
1. Fowler, JL, 130. 
2. Rand, ECHU, xxi f. 
3. 
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and the other three implicitly, an accepted philosophical 
theory or wa.s his attack aimed at tr.e non technical opinion of 
nis day and was to>ereby worthy of the &ppellation "a strawu-.&!1 
argument'?" The problem does not, as me.y be seen above, 
admit of easy solution; yet the stLtdent must settle this 
question in order to have a proper evaluation of the polemic 
and an adequHte comprehension of Locke's theory of knowledge. 
It seems an inevitable co!1clusion of this snelysis 
of the ~roblem that Locke was, in the first place, attacking 
the theory of innate ideas and principles as it was under-
stood from the writings of Descartes. For this opinion we 
submit the consensus of philosophers such as Regis, Gassendi, 
Leibniz, Voltaire, Santayana, Alexander, and Fraser. 
The other facet of the problem is to determine lvhether 
this attack was egainst. a real philosophice.l theory held 
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by a philosopher or school of philosophy. It has been shown 
(1) that Descartes' phraseology sometimes fell into ambiguities 
which left room for the impression that he held to the crude 
form of innate ideas (e.g., prenatal infants have the notion 
of God), and as a result he was attacked for holding the 
crude forJJ by cri t ice both before and after Locke' .s day; 
(2) that 'tlhen he was charged ~lith the crude form by Gassendi, 
he did not consider it a strange or unfair accusation but 
11sed the theory hi'llself in his reply, which may have meant 
only prenatal hunger and cold, however, there is nothing 
to show that he had such experiences in mind, But, on the 
contrary, his choice of words left his opponents reason to 
assume with confidence that he was committed to the theory; 
{3) that whether t.he problem resulted from a semantical 
error or an incomplete philosophy on Descartes' part, will 
remain an open question, but in either case Locke 1 s attack 
was reasonable; (4) that without appealing to the crude form, 
it is beyond doubt that Descartes held to the more formal 
sta.tement of innate principles in his insistance that the 
necessity of certain propositions requires the positing of 
innateness for them, Xh1s theory Locke objected to on the 
grounds that self-evidence is all that need be attributed 
to them, ~herefore, if the crude form cannot be found in 
Descartes, but in a.nother antagonist, e.g. the Cartesia.ns, 
still Locke ha.d grounds for the second part of the polemic 
in Descartes' formal statement of innate princinles; {5) 
that Locke spent many years w.lth Gassendi and certain 
Carteria.ns and sat in on the debates which schooled him well 
in their theories, Oonsequently with his fidelity to facts 
(Fraser's oft repeated words) it is difficult to believe 
that he w:J uld misrepresent their system by setting up, as 
their 1 s, an exaggerated and unfair ·theory. 
In summarizing this treatment of Descartes as an 
antagonist of the polemic, we conclude that, in the esse of 
Descartes, at least, it seems inevitable that either he 
held to the crude form of innate ideas early in his thinking 
and then modified it to the formal statement; or he always 
held to the formal statement, but made the mistake of 
writing in loose ph1·aseology words that sounded like the 
31 
crude form, · This ca.ught the eye of a variety of philosophers 
and gave them the occasion for attacking him as a teacher 
of the crude form of innate ideas. In addition, it may be 
said without fear of contradiction that, Descartes held 
specifically to the formal statement of innate principles 
which Locke attacked in the polemic. Furthermore, as has 
been indicated above, the Cartesians have been pointed out 
unhesitatingly by numerous critics &s being in the mind of 
Locke while he wrote his polemic. Fraser was quoted to this 
effect. To go a step farther, Leibniz, Voltaire, Gibson, 
Aaron and others do not hesitate to ascribe the crude view 
to the Cartesians. Here for example are the latter's words--
Locke had fou.nd the Cartesians and others vaguely 
talking about thoughts in the womb and had realized 1 that only their va.gueness saved them from absurdity. 
This drives us to the decision that Descartes and the 
Cartesians were implicitly if not explicitly one source of 
both the crude form and the formal statement of the theory 
of innate ideas and principles which was the object of Locke's 
polemic. This is also true in the case of the Cambridge 
Platonists who were a second source (speaking logically 
not necesss.rily chronologically). The university teachers 
and Lord Herbert also added to Locke's material. 
We are now in a position to answer the cha.rge that 
Locke set up and overthrew a straw-man in his polemic against 
innate idea:s. If; :l!.t is meant that no philosopher or 
1. Aaron, JL, 82. 
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school of philosophy held to the crude form as a main point 
in a pLilosoph'ical system and stated it specifically, and 
the only method of proving that someone did would be to 
produce such a specific quotation; we object that tnis is 
an unreasonable request. However, if in order to invalidate 
the straw-man argument charge against Locke it would be 
necessary only to adduce certain concrete illustrations and 
indicate how they might have been accepted as truths and 
taught as dogmas in philosophical circles, we declare that 
Locke should be freed from the straw-man argument accusation 
and perhaps it should once more be affirmed that, at least 
in his polemic, he rendered an invaluable service to technical 
philosophy and not simply to popular thought. It is, then, 
the problem of the second chapter to a.nalyze the three typical 
criticisms charged against the polemic in their chronological 
order and determine whether or not the polemic can stand. 
In the interest of greater clarity, it might be 
advantageous to set in clear relief the distinction between 
the theory of innate ideas as held by Descartes and the 
theory of innate powers as held by Locke. By innate ideas, 
Descartes seems to have meant that we are prone to think in 
certain ways and according to certain 'germs of thought' 
already in the mind at birth. This he was convinced of due 
to the necessity and universality of certain truths. Whether 
the 'germs of thought' were, according to Descartes, mental 
content (e.g., the idea of God in the minds of infants) or 
latent knowledge (e.g., the law of identity) in :the :minds.:df 
adults) was immaterial to Locke. He attacked both forms, 
for he contended that they were merely two different ways 
of expressing the same doctrine. His objection was that the 
necessity and universality of these truths proved only their 
self-evidence, not their innate quality. LocKe fought for 
the innateness of the intuition by which these truths were 
deemed self-evident and rejected the theory of the innateness 
of the propositional knowledge,l His contention was that if 
there were innate ideas they would be open to logical 
scrutiny, for anything which is not known is not knowledge. 
Therefore, by definition, innate ideas and/or principles 
must be known at birth, or the terms are meaningless. 
Similarly, latent knowledge, by definition, is a contradic-
tion in terms. 
It is regretable that Locke did not lay greater stress 
on the innate powers of the mind, which he so readily affirmed 
faith in, but to assert that he denied them, is to tilt with 
windmills. For he named, though briefly, the innate powers 
of the mind in Book Four of the Essay. They are (1) under-
standing (i.e., the perception of the ideas in our minds, the 
perception of the signification of signs, and the perception 
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of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas) and (2) willing.2 
Now the question may be asked, Can Locke's new position 
stand up under close scrutiny? The answer will be found in 
Chapter II. 
1. Cf. Ch. III of this Thesis. 3. Locke, ECHU, II.XXI, 6• 
CHAPTER II 
AN EVALUATION OF LOCKE'S POLENIC 
1. Criticisms of Locke's Polemic 
To do what John Locke did, whether in the field 
of philosophy, theology, ethics, logic, or any other is to 
invite criticism. For he stormed the stronghold of convention 
and upset tradition. His rejection of the basis of reason, 
so called, aroused in some about the same resentment as 
did the famous words of Ni.at-zache' 1 s Zarathustra, 11 God is 
dead? 111 
It is not surprising, therefore, that John Locke 
has been criticized. He was wrong in the eyes of the vast 
majority of thinkers as well as those who merely listened. 
Among hie criticll were a number who were then and are toda.y 
considered insignificant. These we snall merely list to 
keep the record complete. They are Lord Stillingfleet, 
2 Bishop of Worcester; John Seargent, Catholic priest;~ 
4 Thomas Burnet, l•iaster of the Charter House; Dean Snerlock, 
afterwards Bishop of London;5 John Norrie, afterwa,rde Rector 
of Bemerton; 6 and John Broughton.? These he classed together 
1. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, 1948, 
2. Vindication of the Trinity, 1690. 
3. Solid Philosophy asserted against the Fancies of the 
Idealists, 1697. 
4. Sacred Theory of the Earth, 1697. 
5. Discourse concerning the Happiness of good men, and 
punishment of the wicked in the next world, 1704. 
6. Cursory Reflections Upon a Book Called an Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, 1690. 
7. Psychologia, 170~. 
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and referred to their words as the books which, "though 
they make a noise against me, at last state the question so 
as to leave no contradiction to my Essay. 111 His critics 
as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, stimulsted certain 
corrections in his positive doctrines, but no one seemed to 
06 
be able to overthrow his onslaught against ideas and principles, 
There are four typical criticisms of his polemic. These 
we shall now consider. 
i. The Objection of Lord Shaftesbury. 
Among the pupils of John Locke was the third Lord 
Shaf-t.esblltlY who did not see the necessity for his instructor 1 s 
elaborate argument agsinst inna_te ideas. He is reported by 
Fraser as saying: 
What has birth, or the progress of the foetus, to do in 
this case? /!fhe true question ii}l~hether the constitu-
tion of man be not such that, being adult and grown up, 
the ideas of order, and administration of a God, will 
not infallibly and necessarily spring up in consciousness. 2 
The answer to the first part of the objection is that the 
birth and progress of the foetus was important for there were 
many within the Church (not to mention those outside) who 
held either to the Creation theory or the Pre-existence 
theory of the soul, both of which talked in terms of the 
soul existing in the foetus before birth. Santaya_na says: 
1. Fraser, ECHU, xlv. 
2. Fraser, ECHU, lxxii. 
" 
The Olltraged plain facts had to be defended against 
sweeping and arbitrary theories. There were no 
innate ideas or maxims: children were not born 
ml!rmering that things equal to the same thing were 
equal to one another; and an urchin knew that pain 
was caused by the paternal slipper before he reflected 
philosophically that everything must have a cause.l 
The answer to the second part of the objection, i.e., that 
man comes to the knowledge of certain truths later on, is 
as Locke would say, You are fighting with me not against 
me. You are calling 11 innate 11 what is only "self-evident. 112 
The thing that is innate is intuition not the propositions. 
For: 
he would be thought void of common sense who asked on 
the one side, OR ON THE OTHER side went to give a 
reason why 'it is impossible for the same thing to be 
and not to be. 1 It carries its own light and evidence 
with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands 
the term assents to it for its own sake or else3nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to oo it. 
Fraser admits tnat 
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Locke himself would hardly deny this LSelf-evident 
truth,i7 "That there are certain propositions, 11 we find 
him acknowle dgeing, "which, though the soul from beginning, 
when a man is born, does not know, yet by assistance 
from the outward senses, and the help of some previous 
cultivation, it may afterwards come either self-evidently, 
or with a demonstrable necessity, to know the trllth of, 4 is no more than what I have affirmed in my first booll:. 11 
Also in Pringle-Pattison we read: 
1. Santayana, TTl-iF, 29f. 
2. Cf. Fraser, ECRU, 64.n.l, 65.n.l. 
3. Locll:e, ECHU, I.III.4. 
4. Fraser, ECHU (from the Prefa.ce to Locll:e's Second 
Edition of the Essay, lxxii) 
/\ 
') 
Locke himself in the very context in which he denies 
their innateness emphasizes the self-evidence of 
principles or maxims he is discussing •.. his 
argument is, that just because they carry their 'own 
light and evidence with them, it is superfluous to sup-
pose them innate. •1 
The answer to the third part of Shaftesbury 1 s objection, 
1. e., that the ideas of order and administration of God 
will infallibly and necessarily spring up in consciousness 
with adulthood, is that as a matter of fact these ideas do 
not infe,llibly and necessarily spring up in the consciousness 
of many. Teleology and theology have been rejected for 
some time by materialistic atheists of no mean intellectual 
acumen. 
ii. The Objection of Lee. 
Henry Lee published in 1702 his Anti-Skepticism 
which was an elaborate chapter by chapter criticism of 
Locke's Essay in which he charged Locke with skepticism 
by lmplicetion. He objects that Locke we.sted his arguments 
beceuse in the 
strict sense which he puts upon the word innate .•. 
he has no adversary. For no one does or can retionally 
assert that the minds of Embryos in the first moment of 
their creation or union to organized bodies, are ready 
furnished with ideas, or have propositions or principles 
implanted in them~ or stamped upon them, that's an 
idle supposition. 
Lee died long before Thomas Fowler wrote his work on Locke, 
but he was a contemporary of Lord Herbert, of whom Fowler 
says: 
1. Pringle-Pattison, ECRU, xxxiv. 
2. Lee, AS, b. 
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though indeed he acknowledges the.t 11 common notions 11 
(the expression by which he designates a priori 
princioles) require an object to elicit them into 
consciousness, seems invariably to regard them as ready-
made ideas implanted in the humen mind from its very 
origin. They are given by an independent faculty, Natural 
Instinct ... they are found in every man, and universal 
consent is the1main criterion by which they ere to be discriminated. 
Therefore, he concludes: 
in fa.ct, there can be no doubt that the dogma of Innate 
Ideas 2nd Innate Principles, in the form attacked by 
Locke, was a natural, if not a legitimate, interpretation 
of much of the philosophical teaching cf the time, 
and that it was probably the form in which that teaching 
was ponularly understood.2 
Lee redefines innateness so that it comprehends all 
perception and knowledge, which does not depend upon the 
contingent impress ions of externa.l causes such as custom 
or education. He says there are some thoughts or proposi-
tions so far innate or natural that the minds of men are 
not left at liberty to judge the truth or falsity of them. 
The soul of man is so framed by the author of nature, 
as not to be equs.lly disposed to all sorts of perception 
. . • but antec.edently to all the effects of custom, 
experience, education or any other contingent causes 
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.•. is necessarily inclined to believe some propositions 
true, others false; some actions good, others evil; 
and so is not altogether like a tabula rasa on which 
you set any impression indifferently ..• because it 
is possessed with such inclinations and dispositions, 
as cannot be altered by accidental causes. Just so 
the soul has an innate power of perceiving, affirming, 
denying, willing, refuting; but when it is, then it 
does as naturally perceive that object, and judge some 
propositions true, others false; some actisns good, 
others evil, as the load stone draws iron. 
1. Fowler, LOC, 130. 
2. Fraser, LOC., 130. 
3. Lee, AS, b. 
' \ 
" 
Lee has :nade two mistakes in this pa.ragraph. First, he has 
placed logical propositions and moral principles on the same 
footing of self-evidence. However, the laws of contradiction 
are necessary for rationality, but moral laws are not. 
Furthermore the contradictories of the hnvs of lo~ic are 
inconceivable. But the con.tlladictories of moral laws are 
not. Therefore, logical propositions and moral principles 
cannot be judged by the same criterion. Second, he has 
merely rephrased what Locke already said '1'/e possess, "common 
sense" or rationality by which we find it impossible to deny 
that "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to 
b ,1 e. 
iii. The Objectio~ of Leibniz 
Although Leibniz found much in Locke's Essay whiah 
he considered "marks of unusual penetration, 112 he objected 
among other things to his thesis concerning cognate ideas 
and principles. However, in his attempt to clear up certain 
obscurities in the Essay, Leibniz himself fell into ambiguity 
s.nd inconsistency. He corrected Locke on innateness in the 
Reflections with one answer and in the Nouveaux Essais with 
another. This makes his position difficult to explain, 
especially in summary. Because of his meta.physical position, 
Leibniz was forced to regard the totality of individual 
knowledge and experience as but. the self-evolution of human 
1. Locke, ECHU, I.III.4. 
2. Leibniz, ROLE, in Duncan, PWL, 100. 
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nature. This evolution was a process of laying bare that 
which was, though less recognizable, there from the beginning. 
Hence, all the ideas which the mind has ever or will ever 
form and all the propositions it has ever known or will know, 
must be innate. In the Reflections he says 
There is something sound in what Plato called reminiscence. 
There is even something more; for we have not only a 
reminiscence of a.ll our past thoughts but also a presenti-
ment of all our future thoughts. It is true that it is 
confusedly and without distinguishing them, and thus 
it is true in a certain sense, that not only our ideas 
but also our sensations, spring from within the soul 
and that the soul is more independent than is thought, 
althought it is always true that nothing takes place 
in it which is not determined and that nothing is f£und 
in creatures which God does not continually create. 
To which Locke might answer, If everything is innate, then 
let 1 s stop talking a.bout innate and use the word potential, 
for all knowledge is certainly not actually there, but only 
potentially; and I am correct when I declare that there are 
no innate ideas, for certainly to have an idea is to have 
some knowledge. 
Now, while Leibniz re-asserted this first statement 
of his notion of innateness in the Nouveaux Essais, the 
argument changes to a distinction of origin between intel-
lectual ideas, and the necessary truths which depend upon 
them, on the one hand, and sensible ideas, and the truths 
of fact into which they enter, on the other. While the 
latter can be explained as the result of experience, the 
former must be regarded as purely inns.te. He says 
The senses, although necessary for all our factual 
knowledge, are not sufficient to give it all to us, 
since the senses never give us anything but examples, 
1. Duncan, Pv~, 100, Par. 5. 
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i.e., particular or individual truths. Now all the 
examples which confirm a truth, whatever their number, 
do not suffice to establish the universal necessity of 
that same truth, for it does not follow that what has 
happened will happen in the same way. Whence it appears 
that necessary truths such as are found in pure mathe-
matics, and particularly in arithmetic and in geometry, 
must have principles whose proof doesnot-depend upon 
examples, nor consequently upon the testimony of the 
senses, although with the senses it would never have 
occurred to us to think of them • . . Logic also, 
together l>ith metaphysics and ethics •.• are full of 
such truths, and consequently their proof can come 
only from internal principles which are called innate. 
It is true that we must not imagine that these eternal 
laws of the reason can be read in the soul as in an 
open book, ••• but it is sufficient th8.t they can be 
discovered in us by dint of attention, for which the 
senses furnish occ~sions, and successful experience serves 
to confirm reason. 
Locke might ask Leibniz this question: What reasons do you 
consider there are for holding that the Law of Contradiction, 
or the idea of substance, must be regarded as having its 
origin in the mind, which do not apply to the idea of red, 
or to the statement the_t sugar is sweet? He tells us that 
ideas of sense are cheracterized by obscurity whereas the 
intellectual ideas are clear and distinct. But if Leibniz 
is following Descartes at this point, a.s he appears to be, 
he is in difficulty for Descartes holds that the obscure 
and confused belong to the mind as well as the clear and 
distinct and furthermore the actual existence which is 
claimed for innate, before it is consciously apprehended, 
consists in its presence in the obscure region of sub-
consciousness. 
Leibniz, on the other hand, writes as if the ideas 
e.nd principles for which a peculiar innateness may be claimed 




were those involved in the knowledge of the mind itself, as 
distinguished from other things. We are as he says 
innate, so to speak, in ourselves • • . Lfoi7 there 
is in us: being, unity, substance, duration, change, 
action, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other 
objects of our intellectual ideas • • . and these 
objects being immedia.te to our understanding ar:d 
always present (although.they cannot always be per-
ceived by reason of our distractions a.nd needs), 
what wonder that we say tha.t these idias wit.:~ all 
depending upon them are innat& in us? 
To justify his contention that these ideas involved in our 
knowledge can be discovered in us for they a.re a.lways 
present before they were consciotlsly apprehended by it, he 
ca.n find no better ground than the immediacy with which the 
mind is present, and always present, to itself. In so 
doing he assumes that the mind must always at least have 
some dim awareness of its own metaphysical na.ture. 
Again he speaks of the necessity of certa.in truths 
a.s being proof of their innateness. To which Locke could 
a.ga.in say, You a.re confusing innate with self-evident, 
which (the latter) has never been denied by me. Fraser 
attests to this in the following passage: 
"In tnis, as in the previous argument, when he 
concludes against innateness, he asserts self-evidence. 112 
This leads us to say tha.t before Leibniz had written his 
~ Essays Locke had answered this objection and what the 
former must do to maintain his position, is to show how the 
intuitive a.pprehension of such propositions implies their 
innateness. 
1. Leibniz, NE (tr. Langley), 45. cf. I.I.25. 




A fine>! try at explaining innateness is mccde by 
arguing that the principles upon which the proof of all 
other truths depend. must be innate for they a.re involved 
in all knowledge. He says: 
The ideas of being, possibility of identity, are so 
completely innate that they enter into all our thoughts 
and reasonings, end I regard them as essential to our 
mind.l 
This e.rgument depends for its validity upon an identifica-
tion of the psychological and the logical orders in thot.tght, 
which was common to both Locke and Leibniz. B~t when 
Leibniz came to consider the sub-conscious, he esst.tmed 
that this identification no longer existed. The universal 
which is logically prior mt.tst have been in the mind before 
the particular can be influenced by and fall under it. 
Thus we are again confused by Leibniz and we do not know 
whether he identifies the psychological and logical as he 
does (in apDerception) or separates them (as he does in 
subeonsciousness). Therefore we conclude that Leibniz, 
at this point, had little to offer John Locke. 
2. The Valt.te of Locke's Polemic 
Far from ;.raf;ing war on an ima<Sinary enemy, it seems 
clear that John Locke e.ttacked a serious problem and rendered 
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a valuable service to philosophy. For he overthrew the doctri~e 
that all men are possessors of certain undeniable ide~:ts and 
principles before they begin to acct.tmulate knowledge. He 
1. Leibniz, NE, 1.3.3. 
showed that these so-called "Innate ideas and principles" 
do not h&.ve univers8l consent which is the reason .Propounded 
by their advocates for believing them. He demonstrated that 
there are no certa.in truths which are given mysteriously 
and are not subject to logical scrutiny. He has made men 
reconsider the whole question of the source of our knowledge. 
As Pringle-Pattison says, "since Locke's time, and largely 
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as a result of his polemic, the terminology has been abandoned."l 
Alexander adds: 
he claimed rightly that the mind should not be credited 
with mysterious knowledge, not verifiable as an idea, 
and his answer is still valid against those who would 
endow the mind with methods of envisaging objects 
(categories and the like) which it imports into the 
object itself. It is this consideration, that what is 
claimed to be a factor in experience must be found there 
and catalogued in the inventory which ~ives ~ts 
philo::;o~'h).Cic.l importance to Locke 1 s polemic. 
Aaron comments: 
its 'value consists, firstly, in showing the absurdity 
of a theory of innate knowledge in the crude sense, 
secondly, in suggesting that human knowledge can be 
explained in its entirety in Eerms of sensation, 
intuition, and demonstration. 
Fowler says: 
it was this determined and vigorous protest against 
multiplying asstlmptions and attempting to 1-Iithdraw a 
vast mass of propositions, both speculati·;e and 
practical, from the control e.nd revision of reason, 
that, perhe.ps, constituted the most distinctive and 
valua.ble part of Locke's teaching. 4 
1. Pringle-Pattison, ECHU, xxxvi. 
2. Alexander, LOC, 56. 
3. baron, JL, 86. 
4. Fowler, JL, 132. 
Finally HcCosh se.ys: 
in attacking the views that were commonly entertained 
in his dsy he did philosophy much service. He was 
succassful in showing that the mind was not born with 
a set of ideas, in the sense of perceptions actually 
formed cr ready to come forth on occasion. He was 
evidently right in holding that the mind has not an 
original repository of abstract and general notions, 
such s.s those of space, of time, of infinity and moral 
good. He showed that all general notions and maxims 
were formed out of particular instances by exercise 
of the faculties.l 
3. Conclusions 
The discussion on innate principles a.nd ideas has 
persisted from the publication of Locke's !::ssay in Harch 
1690 to the present day because in the final analysis there 
is no empirical method for the verification or falsification 
of Locke's arguments. No one can examine a consciousness 
and determine with certainty what it contains, therefore, 
the question will remain speculative. However, this does 
not minimize the importance of the discussion in the field 
of epistemology. 
It he.s been pointed out in this chapter (1) that it 
was custcrna.ry in Locke's day for certain philosophers 
(Oartesiens) to speak of the mind as containing ideas and 
principles (from Pleto) and theologians (Roman and Anglican) 
to speak of the mind as 'loaded' (from Aquinas) or to speak 
of' the mind as being 1 stamped 1 (from Augustine) with ideas 
from its beginning; (2) that this was taken 
to mean either actual knowledge or l&tent kno;;ledge, prior 
to sensory experience; (3) the.t Locke attacked this doctrine 
1. McCosh, LTOK, 49-50. 
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in both forms; (4) that what was being called 'innate' 
was no more than self-evident and necessary to rationality; 
(5) that while stripping the mind of presensory mental con-
te!1t and latent kno~1ledge he was still affirming the faculty 
of knowing, cs.pa.ci ty for knowing or the rational structure 
of the mind; (6) that he did not deli~it what he meant by 
'faculty of knowing 1 or 'ra.tional structure 1 or 'capacity' 
because he saw no need to explain that sui generis rationa-
lity of the mind. 
We thus conclude th<?.t Locke cleared the mind of all 
inborn mental content and latent knowledge, whether in the 
form of ideas, e.g., the knowledge of God, or principles, 
e.g., the Law of Contradiction, end his point we.s well 
established. Some have since said that he fought a straw 
man, but it has been demonstrated that there were those 
(Cartesians and others) who talked about inna.te ideas and 
principles, either as mente.l content or la.tent knowledge. 
Locke shm1ed tha.t if this inna.teness was mental content it 
we.s absurd and if it was 1 lat ent knowledge 1 as Fraser uses 
the term which needs experience to evoke it, then it is 
self-evident but not innate. However, we must make t11is 
point lucid--that in his attack upon the theory of innate 
knowledge, Locke had no intention or thought of destroying 
innate rationality. He would blush for S!le.me were he to 
know that philosophers took up what he considered to be the 
1 
ridiculous claim of his contemporary, Leibnit;, · i.e., that 
1. Spelled 1eion1t z '" in Langley 1 s translation of 
the ,~;ouveaux l!.ssais. 
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Locke destroyed innate intelligence, which he dismissed 
with these words; 11 This sort of fiddling makes me hardly 
avoid thinking that he LLeibnii7 is not that very great man 
that has been talked of him. 111 Locke respected innate 
intelligence so greatly that he waged a relentless war 
against the theory that there was mysterious knowledge 
given to mankind innately which could not be examined 
by his own mihd. He challenged innatenss of knowledge in 
order that innateness of rationa.lity might be properly 
understood. 
The problem of Chapter III will be to review 
critically his theory of kncwledge in an attempt to 
determine whether Leibniz was correct in saying that Locke 
went too far with his crusade and permanently strip the 
mind of rationality. 
1. Locke, 11 Letter to Molyneux" in King, LLJL. 
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CHilPTER III 
INNATENESS A\I!D LOGICAL HECESSITY 
In Che.pters I and II we analyzed enf, evaluated 
Locke's polemic a.gainst Innate Idea.s. In Cnepter III 
we shall consider one of the first problems which arose 
as e. result of Locke's negative position in regard to innate 
ideas. The problem was, Is there any relation between 
innateness end logical necessity? 
Locke tenaciously held that Innate Idec;.s e.nd 
Principles were contrary to experience, unnecessary to 
knol'lledge, gnd detrimental to the adva.nce of reason. The 
collision of his "new way of idees 11 , 1 as it was called by 
Stillingfleet, with the rec ived maxims, shocked those who 
had been accustomed to defer to authority, and fee their 
minds on e bstractions. The result was that the Essa:e 
encountered criticisms a.lmos t as soon as 1 t appeared. This 
criticism was no doubt hastened by the publication of the 
2 ( r )3 Abstract of the Esse.y 1688 in French, 1690 in ~nglish 
severEl years previouo to the publication date of the 
Essay itself, vlhi ch gave thinkers the opportunity to have 
their objections all m&rshalled for the fr2.y. John Norris, 
an Ene;lish mystic, afterwards rector of Bamberton, published 
1. Locke, LEW, 72. 
2. King, LLL (copy of Abstract). 
3. Gerhardt, NE, 26. 
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his Cursory Reflections upon a Book called a.n Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, in which he blamed Locke: 
for setting himself tc prove that there are no 
innate natural principles, 1 and then 'inconsistently' 
granting that 'there are self-evident propositions 
to which we give ready assent' as soon as they are 
understood, while he still denies that the assent is 
'universal', on the ground that it is not consciously 
given in many cases; 1it being a contradiction to 
assert, 1 so Locke argued, 1that there can b;, any truths 
imprinted on the soul of which the soul is unconscious.l 
This was the beginning of the controversy over rejecting 
innateness and holding to self-evidence, in consequence of 
which some have charged Locke with involving himself in 
a quibble. 
However, Locke did not consider this question to be 
simply one of semantics, but one of philosophical importance. 
The difference between innateness of principles and self-
evidence of principles, he refused to let pass unnoticed. 
The thing which is innate, Locke insisted, is the intuition 
by which we see the self-evidence of principles. The 
principles are not themselves innate. If they were inna.te 
ole would not need to learn them or even evoke them, but 
experience tells us that we do. 
But what is the difference between saying principles 
are innate, because they are self-evident and saying 
principles are self-evident? First, if the self-evident 
quality proves their innateness, then it proves too much, 
1. Fraser, ECHU, xlii. 
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for, then all self-evident propositions also must be innate. 
Then, all geometric axioms, geometric truth, mathematical 
maxims, mathematical truths (i.e., 1,692 x 3,471 = 5,872,932), 
natural philosophy, the other sciences, etc., must also be 
innate. As Locke says: 
these and a million of such other propositions, as 
many at least as we have distinct ideas of, every man 
in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing whs.t the 
names stand for, must necessarily assent to.l 
Second, identifying them as self-evident propositions, 
does as much for them as calling them innate does (i.e., 
the mind recognizes them as self-evident) while it avoids 
the awkward implication of stocking the mind in a prenatal 
experience. 
But why does the mind recognize them as self-evident 
or wherein lies the quality of self-evidence? A self-
evident proposition is one whose contradictory can not be 
conceived and whose truth is obvious upon the first under-
standing of its meaning. This quality of self-evidence 
is seen by the mind when the proposition is set before it 
and the meaning is clear. The 'seeingl of the self-evident 
quality is by intuition. 
But does not Locke~ase self-evidence in the same 
manner as Descartes used innateness with reference to 
propositions? The answer is a qualified yes, bat- he made 
this s.dvance over Descartes: he shows us ths.t it is not 
the principle which is innate, but the faculty, namely, 
1. Locke, ECRU, II.I.l8. 
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intuition, which judges the proposition. Tpe laws of 
logic are not the property of the mind any more than the 
laws of physics are the property of the body. They both, 
1. e., the mind and the body, insofar as they function properly 1 
work in conformity to their respective laws. In other words, 
the laws of logic govern the mind, they are not born oli th it; 
in fact, they were in existence before my mind was born. 
The laws of logic are in the nature of things, as the ls.ws 
of physics are; for this is a rational universe. The formal 
statements of laws of logic and physics may be learned by 
rational creatures. The law of gravity makes a good parallel 
to the law of identity, for bodies work in conformity to the 
former and minds work in conformity to the latter. Is it 
any more rea.sonable to say that the law of gravity was innate, 
then to say that the law of identiy was innate? But, if the 
law of gravity was innate, why did the scientific world have 
to wait for Newton to observe and define it? Or if the law 
of identity was innate why did the worla h&.ve to wait for 
Aristotle. 
·~Now, there are some who think that if one admits 
that the laws of logic are not innate, then we have no 
rationality and Locke has denied innate intelligence. But 
this is an urmecessary conclusion, for Locke would a.nswer: 
'rationality is the possession of reason which is the 
faculty or power of drawing conclusions, either demonstra-
tively, by deduction from self-evident propositions, or 
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inductively, on grounds of probability, in conformity to 
the laws of logic. This does not mean that the mind 
mea.sures each proposition by its own individual 1 ruler 1 
of logic held in the mind, but, by comparing, judging, 
inferring, and abstracting ideas. There are four degrees 
in reason, Locke tells us: 
the first and highest is the discovering and finding 
out of truths; the second, the regular and methodical 
disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and 
fit order, to make their connection and force be 
plainly and easily perceived; the third is the per-
ceiving their connection; and the fourth a making a 
right conclusion.l 
It appears that the human mind, e.s it works, seems more to 
be working in confor~ity to the laws of logic, than using 
something which is native to it apart from learning. If 
this were not so a child would not appear so illogical as 
he does at times. Furthermore, the laws of logic, as we 
!mow them, e.re only the formal st~;tement of them, which may 
be varied fr·om one a.pplicat1on to another; e.g., 1A is not 
non-A' or 'A chair is not a non-chair'. To assert that 
Loc!~:e rejected the laws of logic is to fly in the face of 
the evidence, for he plainly said: 
he would be thought void of common sense who asked 
on the one side, or on the other side went to give 
a reason why 'it is impossible for the same t,:ing 
to be and not to be'. It carries its own light and 
evidence witt it, and needs no other proof: he that 
understands the terms assents to it for its own sake 
or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with 
him to do it. 2 -
1. Locke, ECHU, IV.XVII.3. 
2. Locke, ECHU, I.III.4. 
Yet among the critics of the Essay, the most 
redoubtable was probably Leibniz who rebuked Locke for 
having stripped the mind of "innate intelligence". 1 This 
caused the latter to make light of Leibniz 1 epistolary 
criticisms as being unintelligible. However, the publica-
tion of the Nouveaux Essais spread the criticism far and 
wide a.nd to this day there axe those who confidently affirm 
that Locke denied innate intelligence in the human mind. 
Having Hume follow him with the former's passive mind, did 
not help Locke. However, it must be remembered that Locke 
held firmly to the intellectual element as an active 
capacity. 
In concluding this chapter, it might be well to point 
out Locke's insistence upon the need and use of the intellect. 
Fraser, falling in line with Leibniz said of Locke: 
that data. of experience are needed, to awaken what must 
otherwise be the slumbering potentialities of man's 
spiritual being; and that human knowledge is the issue 
of sense when sense is combined with latent intellect, 
is an interpretation of the 'estab~ished opinion', which 
Locke does not fairly contemplate. 
This is an example of how certain philosophers have merely 
followed the lead of another without questioning for 
themselves. For Locke is lucid at this point: 
God has furnished men with faculties sufficient to 
direct them in the way they should take, if they will 
but seriously employ them that l~ay, when their 
ordinaxy vocations allow them the leisure.3 
1. Leibniz, NE, 13. 
2. Fraser, ECHU, 37. 
3. Pringle-Pattison, ECHU, 18. 
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Gibson comments thus: 
now the existence of an innate 'power' or 'capacity' 
for knowledge Locke had no intention of calling into 
question. He assumes throughout that the mind has 
'inherent faculties' which it beings into the world 
with it. 
Aaron also finds this to be the case: 
it may be argued that we are all at least potentially 
capable of knowing these principles. If this means 
that we possess from the first a capacity to know them 
Locke agrees with this view. He accepts innate 
capacities.2 
Burnet, an early critic of the Essay, asked whether the 
author of the Essay allowed any powers to be innate to 
mankind, to which Locke protested that probably nobody 
who read his Essay (this was prior to Leibniz' criticism), 
except Burnet, would ever come to that conclusion. He 
answered 1 I spoke only of inna.te idea.s and not of innate 
3 powers 1 • 
Locke is so obvious at this point that he tea.ching 
concerning native intelligence may even be found in his 
Two Treatise of Government, where he says: "we are born 
free, as we are born rational, but not that we have the 
4 
actual exercise of either. 11 Fraser finally a.dmits 
concerning Locke's origin of ideas: 
1. Gibson, LTOK, 38. 
2. Aaron, JL, 71. 
3. Burnet, 
4. Locke, TTG 
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'white paper' might suggest that we are ori5inally 
void of ideas or appearances of which there is 
consciousness; but not necessarily void of lafent 
capacities and their intellectual implicates; 
which is exactly what Locke is saying throughout the 
Essay. 
To answer the question posed at the beginning of 
this chapter, we must say unhesitatingly that Locke wisely 
held that there is no relation between innateness and 
logica.l necessity, and that there is no inconsistency in 
rejecting the former and affirming the latter. 
To attack Locke, as Kant did, for failing to 
analyze the capacities of the mind is certainly legitimate 
for while Locke said it was not his purpose, the very nature 
of his subject demanded it. However, to attack Locke, as 
Leibniz did, for denying innate intelligence because he 
denied innate ideas, is non sequitur. 
Conclusions. 
In this Chapter we have considered the problem 
of the preservation of logical necessity without innate 
ideas. First, it was decided that the two are not 
synonymous for the following Deasons: (1) if' they exe 
synonymous, then all geometric axioms, mathematical 
maxims, natural philosophy, and the other sciences, must 
be innate and many things of which I will never be aware 
are innate, ~lhich is mere potentiality. 
1. Fraser, ECRU, 121, n. 2. 
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Second, it was decided that classifying them 
as self-evident does as much for them as calling tt.em 
innate. In addition, it avoids the illoEical use of the 
word innate in place of potential, and the awkward 
implication of stocking the mind with pre-experiential 
data. 
Third, it was decided that inns"te ideas are not 
synonymous with innate intelligence, for the human mind 
is not stocked with the laws of logic, but rather it 
works in conformity to them in a" rational universe. In 
addition, Locke assumed throughout the Essay that the mind 
has inherent capacities which it brlnss into the world 
with it. He never questioned these innate powers, which 
was a decided weakness of his work, but not an outright 




THE PROBLEH OF CERTAINTY 
Clceely related to the problem of logice.l necessity 
of Chapter III is the problem of certainty 1·rhich is the 
burden of this chapter. 
As background for this discussion it will be well 
to remember that before Locke's day the question was, Is 
our certainty more properly found in Reve:ation or Reason? 
Now Locke posed a. question which cut diagonelly across 
philosophical thought, namely, Is there certainty? 
Theology he.d traditionally set revelation above a.nd 
beyond the examination of reason. Reason was held to be 
unnecessary for the knowledge of God and His will. Under 
the leadership of Descartes and his contemporaries, reason 
was raised to its rightful position, that of priority over 
revelation. This did not disturb Locke. He readily 
accepted the priority of reason as the guide for revelation. 
ll'here the tension came between tbe two systems was in the 
attitude of Descartes concerning the senses, who releg~ted 
them to ~ secondary position in the acquisition of knoHledge. 
In his Meditations, Descartes says: 
and so far as concerns the ideas of corporeal things, 
I ci_o not recs;:;;c:i::e i:c tl12:n ".nythint; so great or so 
excellent as might not possibly !lave come from myself; 
for when I consider them more closely ••. I find that 
there is but a very little in them that I can conceive 
clea.rly and distinctly; to wit, msgnitude, or rather 
extension in length, bree.dth, and depth; figure • • • 
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as for other things, such as light, colors, sounds, 
odors, flavors, heat, cold, and other qualities which 
fa"ll under the sense of touch, they occur in my thought 
in so much obscurity and confusion that I do not !mow 
even whether they are true or false; that is to say, 
whether the ideas which I conceive of these aualities 
are indeed ideas of any real things, or whether they 
represent to me mere chineras, which cannot exist.l 
This was a fa tal step for Descartes and his contemporaries 
to take, and John Locke was quick to seize upon it. The 
senses were necessary as the means of the acquisition of 
knowledge. This Kant after him reaffirmed. 
The Rationalists had gone too far and in the spirit 
of the reformer, John Locke set about to pu~l them down 
from their high places. Bowen says of them: 
their chief fault was intellectual arrogance. Philosophy 
to them was a science of first nrincioles carried out 
to its ultimate results, and verifie£ by its adequacy 
to meet every case and settle every doubt. It was long 
ago remarked of Descartes, that he began by doubting 
every thing, even his o'l-m existence, and ended by 
thinking that he had proved e~ery thie1g, so as to leave 
his successors nothing to do. 
Given their intellects, the Rationalists claimed that they 
could spin out the whole universe in demonstrable proofs. 
Locke, as well as others, saw the fallacy in this and •~rote 
the follo11ine; in the introduction to his Essay: 
the Cendle that is set up in us shines bright enough 
for all pl.lrposes. The discoveries we can make with this 
ought to satisfy us; and we shall tien use ol.lr under-
standings right, when we entertain all objects in that 
way and proportion tha"t they are sui ted to our faculties, 
1. Descartes, lied. (tr. Torrey), 1~6. 
2. Bowen, l·!P, 0,4,. 
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and upon those grounds they are capable of being 
proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately 
require demonstration, and demand certainty, where 
probability only is to be had, and vlhich is sufficient 
to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve 
everything, because we cs.nnot !mow all things, we shall 
do much-what a.s wisely as he who would not use his legs, 1 but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly. 
Certaintly was the by-word in Locke 1 s day. To doubt 
that we should be certain of such things as faith, substance, 
causality, and infinity, was heresy as Lee's Anti-scepticism 
and stillingfleet's Vindication of the Trinity, two of the 
first objections to Lock:e 1 s Essay, abundantly prove. He 
was well aware of this, yet, he felt the need to set things 
right in regard to hurne.n knowled.ge. 
it is therefore worth while to 
between opinion and knowledge; 
measures, in things whereof we 
edge, we ought ~o regulate our 
our persuasion. 
Thus he says: 
search out the bounds 
8nd examine by what 
have no certain knowl-
assent end moderate 
The word knowledge he limited to certainty, the 'vord 
he used for that assent JoJhich 1ve give to any proposition, 
the truth of which we as yet heve no certe,inty. The words 
belief, faith and assent are also in the realm of probabilit~ 
Having these definitions before us we will now proceed 
to determine the limits Locke put on knowledge and not 
concern ourselves with probability and its synonyms; for 
Locke gives us three types of certain knowledge and it is 
at this point that the problem of this chapter arises. 
1. Locke, ECHU, Intro., 5. 
2. Locke, ECRU, Intro., 3. 
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His technical definition of knowledge is 11 the 
present view the mind has of the agreement or disagreement 
of any of its ideas and of the rela.tion they have one to 
1 another~" The first degree of knowledge is bare intuition. 
It is the clearest and most certain that the human mind 
ever experiences. Locke says: 
if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we will 
find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement 
or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, 
without the intervention of any other. In this the 
mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but 
nerceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by 
being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that 
white is not black, and a circle is not a tryangl~, that 
three are more than two and equal to one and two. 
Yet, there are times when the mind cannot always perceive 
the agreement or disagreement of its ideas immediBtely, 
therefore, Locke adds: 
in this case then, when the mind cannot so bring it's 
ideas together as by their immediate comparison, as 
it were juxta-position or application one to another, 
to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain, 
by the intervention of other ideas (one or more, as it 
happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement 
which it s~arches; and this is that which "tole cs.ll 
reasoning. 
This is the second degree of knowledge, which is found by 
reasoning, the process whereby the mind, lacking bare 
intuition, goes about to find intermediate steps, called 
proofs, to fill in the gaps. These are mediate steps, 
the agreement or disagreement of which with the other 
1. Locke, ECRU, II.I.l. 
2. Locke, ECHU, IV.II.l. 
0. Locke, ECHU, IV.II.2. 
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ideas, is called demonstration, the second type of knowledge. 
It is called knowledge and is certain because the steps 
are perceived by intuition. This knowledge, though it be 
certain, yet the evidence of it is not altogether so 
clear and bright, nor the assent so ready, as in bare 
intuitive ~nowledge, the first degree. This is due to the 
fact that before the demonstration, there was a doubt. 
There is, also, a third degree of knowledge which 
is, again, certain. 1'his he calls sensitive knowledge, 
and explains it in this manner: 
there is, indeed another perception of the mind 
employed ebout the particular existence of finite 
beings without us, which, going beyond ba.re probabil1j;y, 
and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing 
degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. 
There can be nothing more certein than that the idea 
we receive from an external object is in our minds: 
this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be 
anything more than barely that idea in our minds ~ •• 
is. that whereof some men think there may be a question 
made ••• but yet here I think we are provided with 
an evidence that puts us past doubting. For I eSk 
any one, Whether he be not invincibly conscious to 
himself of a different perception, when he looks on 
the sun by day, and thinks on it by night? We as 
plainly find the difference there is between any idea 
revived in our minds by our memory, and actually 
coming into our minds bl our senses, as we do between 
any two distinct ideas. 
There is something found in the sense-data that is wanting 
in other ideas; even though we may be unable to explain in 
whe.t the 'reality' of sense-ideas consists, and can only 
appeal to the contrast of the two experiences--that of 
actually seeing the sun, and only dreaming about the sun, 
1. Locke, ECHU, IV.II.l4. 
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or imagining it when awake. Thus, Locke sets up his 
three degrees of knowledge: 11 viz, intuitive, demonstrative, 
and sensitive; in each of which there are different degrees 
and ways of evidence and certainty, 111 for all are based on 
intuition. 
In all of these types of knowledge is the intuitive 
perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas; 
This perception he divides into four sorts: (1) Identity 
or Diversity, 1. e., the perception of what an idea is and is 
not, (2) Relation, e.g., the perception of the necessary 
implication exemplified in geometrical propositions, 
(3) Co-existence, e.g., the perception of the empirical 
connections of fact which are investigated by physical 
science; and (4) Real Existence, i.e., the perception of 
the agreement of any idea with any real existence. Here 
Locke comes the nearest to setting up the categories of the 
!Jiind. 
Now, unfortunately there are problems in both the 
second (deductive knowledge) and the third (sensitive 
knowledge) types of knowledge. Let us consider, first his 
deductive knowledge and the problem concerning it. As long 
as he stays in the realm of geometry or mathematics, we have 
no grievance; but, when he tries to bring the knowledge of 
God (which he rejected with all other innate ideas and 
principles in Book I) back as certain knowledge via 
deduction, he has committed a serious error. 
1. Locke, ECHU, IV.II.l4. 
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Dismissing the Ontological Argument used by Descartes 
with these words: 
it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and 
silencing atheists, to lay the whole stress of so 
important a point as this upon that sole foundation:_: 
1:1nd take some men 1 s having that idea of God in their 
minds, (for it is evident some men have none, s"nd 
some worse than none, and the rost very different,) 
for the only proof of a Deity; 
he maintains that he can, by demonstration (certain 
knowledge) prove the existence of God. This he endea.vors 
to c1o by virtue of three arg11ments, bound llP together, 
which have since come to be known as (1) the argument from 
necessary being, (2) the arg11ment from ca11se and effect 
(or causal argument) and (3) the anthropological argument. 
He proceeds as follows: 
this, then, I think I may take for a. truth, which 
every one's certain knowledge ass11res him of, beyond 
the liberty of do11bti~g, viz., that he is something 
that actually exists. 
He establishes this certainty by the appeal to intLtition: 
for nothing can be ~ore evident to Lts than oLtr own 
existence. I thin\[,I reason, I feel pleasLtre and 
pain •.. if I doLtbt of all other things, that very 
doLtbt makes me perceive my own ~xistence, a"nd will 
not sLtffer me to doLtbt of that.~ 
This is Ltndo11btedly the Cogito, ergo sum argument of 
Descartes with this revision--that Descartes appealed to 
deduction saying, 'I think, therefore I exist', while Loc k:e 
appeEled to intuition or inspection saying: 
1. Locke, iCHU, IV.X.7. 
2. Locke, ECRU, IV.IX.2. 
3. Locke, ECHU, IV.IX.3. 
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as for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly 
and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable 
of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us 
than our own existence. Experience then convinces us, 
that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, 
and an internal infallible perception that we are.l 
This being granted, he moves a step further in his 1demonstra-
tion1 by appeal to the 1maxim 1 that whatever begins to exist 
must find a concrete cause into which its existence may be 
refunded. In this manner, Locke is appealing to the tra-
ditional Scholastic argument that contingent being (in-
dividual human beings) requires necessary being (God) as 
its source. There are two parts to this argument, both of 
which are faulty. First, that every effect must have a 
cause, or to quote him: 
man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing 
can no more produce any real being, than it can be 
equal to two right angles L for_7 what had a beginning 
must be produced by something else.2 
But this is not the case, for Hume has adequately shown that 
we have no idea of necessary connection. He says in his 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: 
when we look about us towards external objects and 
consider the operation of causes, we are never able, 
in a single instance, to discover any power or 
necessary connection; and quality, which binds the 
effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible 
consequence of the other.3 
Philosophical thought, for the most part, has since Hume 1 s 
day granted his contention and rejected Locke's appeal to 
the 1law 1 of cause and effect. 
1. Locke, ECRU, IV.IX.3. 3. Hume, ECRU, sec. VII, part I. 
2. Locke, ECRU, IV.X.3. 
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However more embarrassing than this, is the fact 
that Locke plainly taught that we do not have a positive 
idea of cause and effectl which of course means that he 
inconsistently used a 1law 1 which he had already designated 
a negative idea. 
The second part of Locke's Causal argument he 
states thus: 
it is evident that what had its being and beginning 
from another must also have all that which is in and 
belongs to its being from another too. All the powers 
it has must be owing to and received from the same 
source.2 
What Locke is saying ie sayiRg is that every cause must 
be a sufficient cause; so that nothing must be looked for 
in the actual effects which did not exist in the cause. 
But he is saying more than this, namely, that the cause is 
equal to or greater than the effect and his whole argument 
depends upon this. But what he fails to see in this, is 
that this same 1maxim 1 would place him in a very embarrass-
ing position concerning the nature of God. For it would 
leave us no alternative but to hold to some sort of a 
materialistic conception of the nature of God. This would 
mill tate ags.inst his concept of God, i.e., "That there is 
an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being • • • is 
evident."3 
Finally he asserts that he has indicated how we can 
1. Cf. Ch. V of this Thesis. 
2. Locke, ECHU, IV.X.4. 
3. Locke, ECHU, IV.X,6. 
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have demonstrative knowledge which is certain of the 
attributes of God, ss follows: 
from the consideration of ourselves, and what 1ve 
infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason 
leads us to the knowledge of this certein and evident 
truth,--That there is an etern1d, most powerful, and 
most knowing Being; which whether a.ny one will please 
to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident; 
and from this idea duly considered, will easily be 
deduced all those other attribftes, which we ought to 
ascribe to this eternal Being. 
But, in reality if he has proved anything positive, he ha.s 
proved a god who is no greater than his effect. The cause 
is a god who is not necessarily any more powerful, righteous, 
and rational than his creation, i.e., the universe. This 
is not the God of Locke's arguments, for this universe, 
with its moments of impotency, irrat ione.li ty, end immorality 
might, as some have dared to suggest, indicate rather tnat 
its creator would more properly be celled a 'cosmic demon'. 
Nonetheless, Locke held firmly to the belief that the 
existence of God could be known with cert<linty. Rmvever, 
Kant has well said: 
although we have nothing to bring against the rational-
ity and utility of this procedure, but rather to comment 
and further it, we still2cannot a.ccept the claims • . • to apodeictic certainty. 
because the existence of God is an impirical fact and even 
Kant who defended the existence of some syntnetic judgments 
a priori, denied the possibility of reasoning from tnem to 
ti1e existence of any perticular things. Therefore, we must 
1. Locke, ECRU, IV.X.6. 
2. Kant, CPR, A624, B652. 
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conclude that Locke did not succeed in his attempt to make 
the knowledge of the existence of God demonstre.bly certain, 
as he claimed he had succeeded in doing. 
3. The Weakness of Locke's Sensitive 
Knowledge of External Objects. 
Let us consider, in the second place, his third 
type of knowledge, na~ely, sensitive knowledge. He claimed 
to have certain, intuitive knowledge of the particular 
1 
existence of finite beings without us, He built his case, 
briefly, as follows: 
it is evident the mind knows not things immediately, 
but only by the intervention of the ideas it has ~f 
them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far 
as there is a conformity between our ideas and the 
reality of things. Thus the idea of whiteness, or 
bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering 
that power which is in any body to produce it ti1ere, 
has all the real conformity it can or ought to have, 
with things without us. And t·is conformity between 
our simple ideas and the existence of things, is 
sufficient for real knowledge LCertainti7,2 
This and other similar passages were the basis for the 
criticisms of Aaron,3 Pringle-Pattison,<! and Emmens,5 \~ho 
objected to his theory of perception. Perhaps it would be 
well to consifer the problem at this time since it is 
entwined with the immediate problem of certainty, The three 
philosonhers, named above, objected that Locke was advocating 
e representation theory or image-theory of perception. And 
if this be tr~.<e, his theory can be redaced to absurdity. 
1. Kant, CPR, A624, B652. 
2. Locke, ECRU, IV. IV. ":5, 
3. A~ren, JL, 90-94. 
4. Prinsle-Pattisen, ECHU, xliv. 
~-. Ernmens, ECHU, 67. 
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For, if' (1) idea.s are immaterial, they cannot resemble 
corporeal bodies; e.nd, on the other hand, if (2) they are 
material, they cannot represent immaterial things, i.e., 
mind, Deity, space, time, etc.; nor can they resemble 
sensitive qualities, i.e., colors, savors, odors, etc., 
which are sensations and. unlike the physical properties which 
produce them; neither CO'n they represent primary qualities, 
such HS solidity, figure, etc., which in this sense are 
abstractions, i.e., substance divesteQ of all sensible quali-
ties. Thus, he can h~:we no knowledge of material or 
immaterial things, bodies, or spirits (but he does claim 
knowledge of both). Still another word may be added to 
the above, for if ideas Hre representative, they must 
be material for they resemble material objects, then the 
mind :nust also be material and Locke is advocating 11ateri-
alism, but this cannot be. 
However, in considering this problem, one cannot 
but wonder why Locke with his keen insight left himself 
in such e hopeless predicament. But an examination of 
the 1proof-texts 1 used by his critics do not plainly 
teach the strict representation theory he is charged with. 
T8ke, for example, the passage used by Pringle-Pattison: 
thus the idea of whiteness, or bitterness, as it is 
in the mind, exactly s.nswering that power which is 
in any body to produce it there, has all the real 
conformity it can or ought to have, with things 
without t:s. Ancl this conformity bet'l-!een our simple 
ideas ana the existfnce of things, is sufficient 
for ree.l kno'I-Iledge. 
1. Pringle-Pattison, ~CHU, xlvi (from ECHU, IV.IV.4.). 
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While this does sound as if Locke v1ere holding to the 
strict representative theory his critics have attributed 
to him, we might remind them that the wcrQ conformity 
carries the meaning of agreement or harmony, not identity, 
Furthermore, Loc~1:e amPlifies the conformity as follows: 
our simple ideas are all real, all agree to the 
reality of things: not that they a.re all of them 
the i:na.ges or representations of whe.t does exist; 
the contrary whereof, in all but the pri T.ary 
1 qualities of bodies, hath been alree.dy shotm.-
It might be said in addition that Locke could not hold 
to the type of perception theory his critics charge 
him with and still say that the sensitive secondary 
qualities are subjective as he does here: 
the power th&.t is in any body, by reason of its 
insensible qualities to operate after a peculiar 
manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce 
in us the different ideas of several colours, sounds, 
smells, tastes, etcA These are usually called 
sensible q~Plities.~ 
Therefore, in the light of these and other passages, 
our conclusion seems to be that Locke does hold a form 
of the representative perception theory, but he cannot 
be charged with the extremes some of his interpreters 
have rea.d into his theory. In hiE> excellent treatment of 
Locke, ·!/ebb devotes ten pages to this .?-iscussion in an 
attempt to prove that Locke should not be criticized 
"' for hol~ing a strict representative theory of perception,v 
l. Locke, ECHU, II. XXX. 2. 
2. Locke, EC~U, II.VIII.23. 
3, '!/ebb, IL, 28-38. 
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Bo~ren also joins Webb and states: 
the very partial and incorrect views, for instance, 
which many persons entertain of Locke's philosophy, 
can be explained only on the supposition, that 
Cousin's criticism of the Essay on Human Understanding 
is much more studied than the Essay itself. In no 
other way can I account for the prevs,lence of the 
opinion, that Cousin's work is a masterpiece of 
philosophical criticism, when,--whatever may be its 
merits in refuting certain obnoxious doctrines, that 
are stated in it,--these doctrines are quite gratu-
itously ascribed to Locke, with reference to whom, 
indeed, the whole work is but a tissue of mis-
representations.l 
While it does not prove the case one way or another, it 
is interesting to not that the arguments of Aaron, 
Pringle-Pattison, and Emmens, were first stated in the 
volume, La Philosophie de Locke, by the above named Victor 
Cousin. 
In an attempt to arrive at a solution of the problem 
at hand, it is perhaps advisable to point out the distinc~ 
tiona made between the various types of qualities of bodies 
suggested by Locke. He states: 
it being necessary to distinguish the primary and real 
qualities of bodies, which are always in them (viz. 
solidity, extension, figure, number, and moti~n, or 
rest, and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the 
bodies are big enough singly to be discerned), from 
those secondary and imputed qualities, which are but 
the powers of several combinations of those primary 
ones, when they operate without being distinctly dis-
cerned.2 
From this and other passages, it 1vould seem that Locke 
conceived of primary qualities as true representations of 
external objects, which called forth this comment from 
1. Bowen, EC, XVII. 2. Locke, ECHU, II. VIII.22. 
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Fraser: 
Locke treats primary qualities as 1real 1 , or 
'perfectly resembling the real, 1 and virtually 
1the same 1 • 
Consequently it must be admitted that either Locke (1) 
held to a representative theory of perception regarding 
primary qualities, while rejecting it regarding secondary 
qualities, and is thereby open to the criticisms stated 
above; or (2) he is guilty of the use of ambiguous language 
which he, himself, severely criticized in others. There-
fore while the comments of lvebb and Bowen are no doubt 
worth of consideration, the criticism of Aaron, Pringle-
Pattison, and Emmens are justified in this area. 
Turning now to whe.t seems to be the greatest weak-
ness in Locke's argument and one that will have no dis-
putants to defend it, let us examine Locke's way of 
certainty. It is strange, indeed, that ~est critics of 
Locke fail to seize upon this wee.k spot in his sensit:l,.'J'e. 
lmo>'lledge. He says, for example: 
the notice we have by our senses of the existing of 
things without us, though it be not altogether so 
certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions 
of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas 
of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that 
deserves the name of knowledge ~certainty_7.2 
In this degree of knowledge, as in the former (deductive 
lmowledge), he has overstepped his definition of knowledge. 
1. Kr.aaer,, £C,HU, 178, n. 2. 
2. Locke, IV.VI.3. 
?2 
He repeatedly said: 11 all we kno~1 is our own ideas", 
but if this be true, then we cannot know whether they 
agree or disagree with their originals, the external 
objects, for we have never seen them, nor can we. Now, 
unless he claims some stre.nge type of a double conscious-
ness, whereby he can look one minute on the external world 
and the next in his own private experience (which nc one 
would dare to suggest) and compare the two, he will 
never heve certain knowledge of their agreement, for he 
has no means of verification. Also, if all he knows is 
his own ideas, he has no right to assert that the origi-
nals exist, for he has never seen them, nor can he ever 
hope to do so. How, then, can he call this third degree, 
sensitive knowledge, and mean by the term 'knowledge' 
intuitive certainty? At this point his theory of certainty 
breaks down, and although he does not appa.rently see it, 
he is locked up to probability. 
This failure may also be seen by an examination 
of his four sorts of perceptions of agreement or disa-
greement (connection or repugnancy) of our ideas. The 
fourth type is Real existence or the actual real existence 
agreeing with our idea of it. This fourth sort is not 
a relation between different ideas at all, but a relation 
between any or all of our ideas, as such, and the real 
'.~orld to which they are assumed to refer. It falls 
entirely outside of the definition; being a species of 
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agreement or disagreement impossible to determine by the 
method of comparison which the definition stipulates. 
In concluding this chapter we may summarize whet 
we have said. Locke thought that he had proved three 
degrees of knowledge to be certain, i.e., bare intuitive 
knowledge, demonstrative knowledge, and sensitive knowl-
edge. However, by his own definition of knowledge he could 
not claim certain knowledge for either external objects 
or the existence of God. 
Therefore, by his own limited definition of knowl-
edge, he should have restricted certainty to intuitive 
knowledge (e.g., a circle is not a square) and demonstra-
tive knowledge (e.g., 7 x 84 = 588). All else should 
have been relegated to realm of probability (e. g., 1 knowl-
edge 1 of the existence of God and other externa.l objects). 
It is to be regretted that John Locke who warned 
against the danger of requiring demonstration and demanding 
certainty where probability only is to be had, should 
himself yield to the temptation to cle.im certa:il.nty for 
arguments which can be said to be only probable. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Problem of Certainty was raised by Locke when 
he drove a wedge between knowledge (certainty) and belief, 
opinion, and assent (probability). 
Locke attacked the bastiOn of certainty in two 
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distinct areas: first, by 1mplication in his war against 
innate ideas; and second, by explication in his division 
of so-called knowledge into knowledge (certainty) and 
belief, opinion, and assent (probability). He wisely 
limited certainty and urged men to be satisfied with 
probability in most areas for certainty is not obtainable, 
and probability is sufficient for our every day living. 
However, he was not immune to the siren call of 
certa.inty and finally submitted--claiming certain knowledge 
of the existence of God and external objects, both of 
which, were entirely beyond the compass of his own defini-
tion of knowledge. This left a glaring contradiction in 
what was for the most part a sterling piece of work. 
Therefore, we must conclude that with respect 
to the problem of certainty, Locke over stepped his own 
boundaries and involved himself in a contradiction in his 
definition and also in his degrees of knowledge. This 
is regrettable, and while it is a decided weakness of 
his empiricism, it does not invalidate his Polemic. For 
apart from mathematics and logical necessity, there is 
no inferential certainty. 
To ask the question, Can there be certainty without 
innate ideas, is begging the question, for the prior 
question is, Can there be certainty? to which the answer 
is, Not in the areas where the proponents of Innate Knowl-
edge improperly looked for certainty, e.g., in maxims by 
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means of which they claimed to gain certain knowledge 
of all things. 
Consequently, Locke 1 s polemic is not overthr01•m 
by the problem of certainty, but rather, the former was 
of marked value (though hampered by inconsiEtencies) 
in properly understanding the latter. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUBSTANCE, INFINITY, AND CAUSE AND EFFECT 
Locke has rejected, with grea.t finality, any 
possibility of the human min~being born with Ideas. 
For Ideas would have to be either as (1) conscious mental 
content, or (2) latent knowledge, the more formal aspect 
of the theory. The former he easily overthrew for it is 
contrary to experience, but the latter is more subtle 
and difficult to disprove. His argument was, briefly 
that there can be no such thing as a latent or uncons~­
lous idea, for even in the case of memory (where ideas 
are stored by 'retension', i.e., keeping ideas for some-
time actually in view, or 'memory', i.e., where ideas 
fade from view) when ideas are revived or perceived later 
it is with a consciousness that they were known or 
perceived before. Innate ideas or principles, if there 
were such, would be present, from the beginning, self-
evident, but not with the memory of having seen them 
before. 
Locke's problem, now, is to account for certain 
characteristic ideas which were considered before, during, 
and since his time by many philosophers, as innate and, 
therefore, impossible to account for in terms of sensation 
or reflection. He proceeds to show how these ideas are 
actually formed from the two sources of knowledge, i.e., 
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sensation and reflection, by the operation of the faculties 
of the mind on the materials supplied. 
He does not take the wasy way out, but chooses 
those ideas which are furthest removed from sense, con-
tending that if he can explain how these ideas are formed 
from the materials of sensation and reflection, he can 
then explain how all our ideas, whatever they may be, 
have their source in these two fountains of knowledge. 
~this chapter we shall examine three of his metapnysical 
ideas, namely, Substa~ce, Infinity, and Cause and Effect. 
(1) Substance 
Locke makes a distinction at the outset between 
complex ideas of particular substances and the conception 
of substance in general. Even though he ultimately 
reta.ins material and spiritual substance in his system, 
his discussion avoids the scholastic conception, with its 
difficulties in defining substance. He anticipated the 
difficulty which would arise in explaining the nature of 
substance after the accidents were removed. 
Therefore, he set himself to the ta.sk of reconsider-
ing the concept of Substance. He admitted, without 
hesitation, that we neither have nor can have the idea 
of substance directly by sensation or reflection, as 
follows: 
I confess there is another idea which would be of 
general use for mankind to have, as it is of general 
talk as if they had it; s.nd that is the idea of 
substance; which we neither have nor can have by 
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sensation or reflection. 1 
Nor is it ge.ined by enlarging or combining the ideas 
experienced. We experience size, color, shape, and so 
on, but enlarge tnese as we may we never get the posi-
tive idea of substance as such. Nor again does it come 
by combining. At this point his adversaries thought 
that he had spoiled his own theory, but, he did not 
think so, for he had rather shut out the innate idea of 
substance, as he said: 
If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we 
might well expect they should be such as by our 
own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves; but 
we see, on the contrary, that since, by those ways 
whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this 
is not, we have no such clear idea at all; and 
therefore signify nothing by the word substance but 
only an uncerte.in supposition of we know not what, 
i.e., of something whereof we have no particular 
distinct positive idea, which we take to be the 2 
substratum, or support, of those ideas we do know. 
While the idea of substance is not immediately experienced 
it can none the less be shown to be derived from what 
is experienced. This is possible only because we do not 
have a positive idea of substance, but merely an obscure 
and relative idea. It is derived, Locke thinks, from 
our experience of qualities and accidents. Our idea 
of substance in general, is then, the idea of a support 
of qualities. Lecke agrees with Schole.sticism that 
substance is a support but denies that it is knowable. 
1. Locke, ECRU, I.IV.l9 (most editions), I.III. 19 (Fraser). 
2. Locke, ECRU, I. III.l9. 
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He states: 
If anyone will examine himself concerning his 
notion of oure substance in general, he will find 
he has no other idea of it at all, but only a 
supposition of he knows not what support of such 
qualities which are capable of producing simple 
ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called 
accidents ••• the idea, then, we have, to which we 
give the general name substance, being nothing but 
the supPOSPd, but unknown, support of those qualities 
we find ex~sting, which we imagine cannot subsist 
sine re substante, without something to support them, 
we call that support substantia; which according to 
the true import of the word Is, in plain English, 
standing under or upholding. 
Our effortli to speak positively of substance a.re like 
those of children when they seek to explain what they 
do not understand. Locke gives us a classic illustration 
of man's inability to explain substance, as follows: 
If any one should be asked, what is the subject 
wherein color or weight adhere, he would have nothing 
to say, but the solid extended parts; and if he 
were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension 
adhere in, he would not be in a :9~h better case 
than the Indian before mentionedi..£/who, saying that 
the world was supported by a great elephant, was 
asked what the elephant rested on; to which his 
answer was--a great tortoise: but being pressed to 
know what gave support to the broa.d-backed tortoise, 
replied--something. he knew not what.3 
Therefore, Locke adopts the ~efinition--Substance is a 
something-I-know-not-\~hat or a Je ne sais quoi. This 
concept was not improved upon by Berkelian spiritual 
substance. 4 Humian unk:nown causes, 5 or the Ka.ntian 
ding an sich~ While Idealists might hold that Berk:eley 
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1. Locke, ECHU, II. XXIII. 2. 
2. Locke, ECHU,II.XIII.l9. 
4. Ber~eley, PHK, Sec.25-27,139. 
5, Burne, THN, I.l.vi.24. 
3. Locke, ECHU, II.XXIII.2. 6. Kant, CPR (tr. Smith), 27. 
improved upon Locke by making all causation depend upon 
spiritual substance he still admits that in the absence 
of a clear and distinct idea of spiritual substance one 
must be satisfied with a notion. Thus Loc~e indicated 
that while the concept of the support to accidents is 
clear, the concept of the support itself, of the some-
thing there common to all substances, is not clear, One 
of his best statements concerning substance in general 
is that made to Stillingfleet, in these words: 
the idea of substance in general is a complex idea 
made up of the general idea of something bei£g, 
with the relation of a support to accidents. 
This conception is of substance in general and is abstract 
because it is gained by abstracting from ideas of parti-
cular substances the element common to all. Thus trte idea 
of substance is already in the idea of s. particular sub-
stance or of a thing. We now move to a consideration 
of the idea of substance in particular. 
In answering the question, what is the source of 
our idea in the case of the particular substance, Loc~e 
did not excel in clarity. It is unfortunate that he 
was not explicit, but nonetheless, his implicit answer 
becomes the assumption used in his argument. He suggests 
that we take an idea of a particular such as table. It 
is a complex idea consisting of the simple ideas of brown, 
hard, smooth, rectangular, and so forth. But in addition, 
1. Locke, WOR, I, 367. 
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there is an extra element. These ideas are experienced 
by me in this case as one group or family belonging 
together. They are observed 'to go together'. Moreover, 
they go constantly together, as he tells us: 
the mind being, as I have declared, furnished with 
a great number of simple ideas conveyed in by the 
senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by 
reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, 
that a certain number of these simple ideas go 
constantly together.l 
There is, then, an awareness of the ideas as 0oing together. 
The mind has no ideas of isolated qualities, but of 
qualities together in one unity. 
This is a significant point in his construction 
of metaphysical ideas, but he does not press this to 
show that he can derive the idea of substance from 
experience alone. His reluctance to do this, is obvious 
for two reasons. First, the idea of substsnce is a 
complex idea and according to Locke's original position 
only simple ideas are given. Second, to say that we 
experience substance, would suggest that in sensation 
we know things as they are through ideas. But sensation 
can never reveal the inner nature of existent things: 
this he has declared before. We must distinguish care-
fully between our complex ideas of substances and the 
substances themselves. The former is not the substance, 
it is not even a true representation of it. The coming 
together of a number of ideas, when a thing affects me it 
1. Locke, ECHU, II.XXIII.l. 
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suggests to me one thing, and I combine these ideas and 
give the whole combination a name. I regard it as the 
name of a substance, that is to say, of an entity in which 
qualities are held together. But this does not give me 
knowledge either of this underlying structure and support 
of qualities, or indeed of all those qualities themselves, 
as they actually are. We call such complex ideas, ideas 
of substance or things; but this does not mean that we 
have any clear positive conception of eubst;mce. In 
fact, Locke thinks that the true nature of any substance 
is hidden from us forever. His final conClusion is that 
our complex ideas of particular substences are ideas 
in the mind only, fra.med according to the suggestions 
of experience, but not providing us with exact knowledge 
of things or substances in nature. 
There is another type of substance, about which 
he has not spoken, namely, spiritual substances. What 
he said about material substances, he now attributes to 
spiritual substences; in fact, he can say that we know 
the one equally as well as the other, which is a positive 
1 
way of saying that we can know neither. Thus he says: 
the same thing happens concerning the operations 
of the mind, viz., thinking, reasoning, fearing, 
etc., which we concluding not to subsist of them-
selves, nor apprehending how they can belong to 
body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think 
these the actions of some other substance, which we 
call sp1rit.2 
1. Locke, ECHU, II.XXIII.5. 
2. Ibid. 
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ConseqQently we know nothing of things beyond our simple 
ideas of them and he conolQdes by saying: 
which we are not at all to wonder at, since we 
having bQt some few SQperficia.l ideas of things, 
discovered to QS only by the senses from withoQt, 
or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments 
in itself within, have no knowledge beyond that, 
mQch less of the internal constitQtion and trQe 
natQre of things, being destitQte of facQlties to 
attain it.l -
Finally, we mQst say that Locke showed that the tradi-
tional view coQld not stand examination. He did not deny 
the being of SQbstance, and he did not deny the need 
of a sQpport of qQalities; bQt he did deny that we have 
knowledge of this SQbstance. Experience itself reqQires 
the existence of something to SQpport the qQalities of 
an object, bQt it does not reveal its natQre. Its 
natQre is hidden from QS and will remain so Qntil we 
gain facQlties whereby the inner natQre of the being 
of things will be revealed. Until SQCh time, we must 
confess that the idea of substance, is a negative idea. 
The idea of substance cannot be used as an example ofan 
innate idea to overthrow Locke 1s polemic against innate 
ideas. 
(2) Infinity 
Locke 1 s treatment of Infinity is e. second step 
in his answer of the objection that there are certain 
positiv~ ideas which are ganed independently of all sense-
1. Locke, ECHU, II •. XXIII.32. 
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experience. In his Essay he admits that we have the idea 
of infinity, but he claims that the only conception of 
infinity which can be seriously considered by us, is the 
quantitative. Once this is admitted he feels fairly 
certain that there can be no further hindrance in the way 
of his argument. But some may object that our conception 
of God is not quantitative. This he answers neatly by 
commenting that God's infinity is on the whole b~yond 
our comprehension. \l'hat we do understand of it is in 
terms of quantity. For example, when we say God has the 
power of the most powerful human being and infinitely 
more; he has the wisdom of a Solomon and infinitely more; 
and the goodness of the saint and infinitely more, we are 
thinking in terms of quantity. Thus he denies that we 
have a clear conception of infinity as quality. If he 
is right Descartes' transcendent metaphysics and the 
whole of Spinoza's philosophy rest upon a conception 
which lacks clarity and is ambiguous. Either an idea 
of qualitative infinity is acquired through perception 
or it was innate. But there are no innate ideas, nor 
by definition, could one ever have experienced qualita-
tive infinity. Therefore, any rational system based upon 
such an idea is, to that extent at least, erroneous. 
Locke insisted that the only infinite we can clearly 
conceive is endless progression in quantity. It is the 
infinitely great in quantity, whether in number, space, 
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time, wisdom, or power. Infinite number is a series 
beginning with the number 1 but never ending. Infinite 
space is space stretching out endlessly in all directions 
from a given point. Infinite time is endlessness whether 
backwards from the present or forwards to the future. 
For Locke no other idea of eternity and no other idea of 
infinity is clear. 
This negative idea of infinity has originated from 
a number of considerations. Experience gives us a finite 
length, a finite period of time, or a finite number of 
objects. We can think of these as doubled, as trebled, as 
quadrupled, and so on without ever coming to an end. Here 
already is the conception of infinity. We may begin with 
any positive number and pass on to higher and higher 
numbers proceeding forward endlessly. Infinity for 
Locke is this endless progression. It is, therefore, an 
idea ultimately derived from sense-experience, i.e., it 
rests upon whe.t is given in sensation. Of course, sensa-
tion only provides the basis, we can never verify in 
experience the endlessness of the series. A positive 
idea of an infin1t e number is, from the nature of the 
case, an absurdity. As Locke says: 
for our idea of infinity being, as I think, an 
endless growing idea, but the idea of any quantity 
the mind has being at that time terminated in that 
idea (for be it as great as it will, it can be no 
greater than it is), to join infinity to it is to 
a.djust a standing measure to a growing bulk,l 
Thus absolute space and absolute time in so far as they 
1. Locke, ECHU, II,XVI1,7. 
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are infinite are essentially negative conceptions. 
Consequently even the idea of infinity, remote 
as it is from the first object of sensation and refelction, 
ultimately rests upon sense-experience. Infinity is not 
itself given in sensation or reflection. Yet it is no 
positive idea known (for instance, innately ) in complete 
independence of sense-experience. On the contrary, .it is 
the consequence of the mind's enlarging can go on forever. 
He rests his case with these words: 
I pretead not to treat of them in their full latitude; 
it suffices to my design to show how the mind receives 
them, such as they are, from sensation and reflection; 
and how even the idea we have of infinity, how remote 
so ever it may seem to be from any object of sense 
or operation of our mind, has nevertheless, as all 
our other ideas, its original there. Some mathemati-
cians, perhaps, of advanced speculations, may have 
other weys to introduce into their minds ideas of 
infinity; but this hinders not but that they themselves 
as well as all other men got the first ideas which 
they had of infinity from sensation and reflection 
in the method we have here set down.l 
We turn now to his consideration of the idea of causation. 
(3) Cause and Effect 
The two preceding discussions culminated in the 
decision that both the ideas of Substance and Infinity 
a.re not positive ideas, but negative, which means that 
neither could be properly considered to be innate since 
we have no clear idea of either. It is Locke's intention 
now to analyze tne idea of Cause and Effect and determine 
1. Locke, ECHU, II.XVII.22. 
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whether or not this idea also is improperly considered 
innate. However, it is not without difficulty that he 
attempts this, for the problem had already been raised 
in philosophical thought by the skeptics and would be 
again by others after, e.g. 1 Hume, since it does not lend 
itself to easy solution. He was aware of the complexity 
of the problem, for he would not say outright that we 
observe a mere sequence, as Hume finally did; but he also 
found it impossible to say that we observe the causal 
activity as such except in the mind-body relationship. 
With this background we proceed to his discussion. 
It appears that Locke could not make up his mind. 
One need only to read the opening paxagraphs of his chapter 
on power to witness the struggle, for example, he says: 
the mind, being every day informed, by the senses, 
of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes 
in things without, and taking notice how one comes 
to an end and ceases to be, and another begins to 
exist which was not before • • . and concluding, 
from what it has so constantly observed to have 
been, that the like changes will for the future be 
made in the same things by like agents, and by the 
like ways, considers in one thing the possibility of 
having any of its simple ideas changed, and in 
another the possibility of making th~t change; and 
so comes by that idea we call power. 
This is of course the regular-sequence theory of causation, 
but Locke does not accept the theory outright. He would 
not give up the further conception, that the effect 
follows from the cause and does not merely follow it. 
He could not deny some elusive, additional element, even 
1. Locke, ECHU, II.XXI.l. 
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though we never observe the causal activity as such. 
Because of this uncertainty in his thinking, his theory 
is ma.rked by vagueness and indefiniteness. On the other 
hand he seems to find an indication of the idea of cause 
and effect, for he states: 
in the notice that our senses take of the constant 
vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that 
several partic:ulars, both qua.lities and substances, 
begin to exist; and that they receive this there 
existence from the due application and operation of 
some other being. From this observation we get our 
ideas of cause and effect • • • thus finding in 
that substance which we call wax, fluidity, which is 
a simple idea, that was not in it before, is constantly 
produced by the applica.tion of a certain degree of 
heat, we ca.ll the simple ~ of heat, in rela.tion 
to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity 
the effect.l 
Now, if Locke were holding to the succession 
theory he would never have written produced by the 
application of, but rather he would have selected words 
with less cs.usal implication such as preceded bY. 
Consequently, his meaning is not clear. 
A consideration of reflection as the possible 
source of our idea of cause and effect may lend clarity. 
He says: 
bodies by our senses do not afford us so clear and 
distinct an ~ of active power, as we have from 
reflection upon the operation of our minds • . . 
the idea of the beginning of motion we have only 
from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where 
we find by experience that, barely by willing it, 
barely by a. thought of the mind, we can move the 
parts of our bodies which were before at rest.2 
1. Locke, ECHU, II.XXVI.t. 
2. Locke, ECHU, II.XXI.4. 
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However, even in reflection Locke does not claim that 
power is fully clea.r and distinct, All that he permits 
himself to say is that power and causal activity are 
better understood by looking inwards than outwards. 1 
He can but lapse into agnosticism about the external 
world. We cannot properly know whether there are in it 
causal activities of exactly the same sort as the causal 
activity I experience when I will to move my arm, 'lie 
do not know the true ne.ture of physica.l causal relations, 
any more than we know the universal essences of the 
substances between which they occur. 
This leaves him no alternative but to conclude 
tha.t natural science cannot be certain, for it does not 
provide knowledge of the necessary causal connections 
between things. It is a system built up of inductively 
esteblished generalizations which at best are only 
probable. He states: 
we are not capable of scientifical knowledge; nor 
shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, 
unquestionable truths concerning them. Certainty 
and demonstration ar~ things we must not, in these 
matters, pretend to. 
However, this does not leave him in the position of Hume, 
for he still explicitly asserts tha.t all tnincs which 
have a beginning must also have a cause , which he states 
thus: 
l. Locke, ECHU, II.XXI.4. 
2. Locke, ECh~, IV.III.26. 
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man knows, by an intuitive certaintyLi{ that bare 
nothing can no more oraduce any real being. than 
it ca.n be ea ua.l to two right angles. 2 
When Hume questions this intuitive certainty he is going 
beyond Locke's position; but when he denies that we observe 
causal activlty directly in sensation, he merely reasserts 
a point already made by Locke. 
Locke 1 s attempt to account for our idea of cause 
and effect, thus, leaves him with both a negative and 
a positive answer which he cannot reconcile, for he 
cannot find the idea given in sensation, nor does he 
find it in reflection, yet he is convinced of the idea 
and uses it to demonstrate the existence of God. Here 
Locke is in a serious dilemma, for if he convinces himself 
that Causality is a positive idea, he can continue to 
use it in his argument for the existence of God, but he 
must almost forfeit his empiricism for he cannot find 
the positive idea in sensation or reflection. On the 
other hand, if he convinces himself that it is a negative 
idee, he must forfeit hi• 'proof' for the existence of 
God. Neither of the horns of this dilemma appeal to him, 
so he leaves the matter unsettled. The answer had to 
wait for Hume, who properly rejected the idea of Cc:.use 
and effect, as Locke should have done before him. 
1. This 'intuitive certainty' is not a.n appeal to 
innate ideas, but to logical necessity. Cf. Che.pter 
III of this thesis. 
2. Locke, ECHU, IV.X.3. 
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Therefore, the correct answer to the question, 
do we have a clear positive idea of Cause and Effect? 
is to be answered, as Hume has amply shown, in the nega-
tive despite Locke's vacillation. We do not, and since 
we do not, the idea of Cause and Effect cannot be shown 
to be an innate idea; and the polemic of John Locke 
remains intact, 
(4) Conclusions 
In this chapter we have seen how Locke attempted 
to show that even the traditionally important metaphysical 
ideas of Substa.nce, Infinity, and Cause and Effect (which 
should be innate, if any of our ideas are innate), (1) origi-
nate from sensation and reflection and (2) are not posi-
tive ideas, but negative. This being the case the possi-
bility of any of our ideas being innate is ruled out and 
his polemic against innate ideas stands the acid test. 
It must be added here that Locke is not denying 
the categories of the mind, which he said were not 
'IIi thin the realm of his discussion for he was analyzing 
the objects of our knowledge and not our capacities for 
knowledge. 1 He thus bifurcated philosophy and psychology 
1. Thomas Burnet •Irate two tracts a.gainst Locke in 1697 
in one of which he asked if Locke 'allows any powers 
to be innate to mankind'? Locke jotted on the margin, 
11 I think noe body but this author who ever read my 
book could doubt that I spoke only of innate ideas; 
for my subject was the understanding, and not of 
innate powers." (Fraser, ECHU, vol. 1, xliv). 
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and earned for himself the appellation 11 the father of 
English psychology 111 for he, in a sense, gave birth to 
the new science. \'ihether Locke would have hailed Hume 
as his logical successor (as much of the history of ~odern 
philosophy has claimed) or Kant (as '1iebb and others have 
claimed) is an open question. To do the former would 
have left him in the uncomfortable scepticism of Hume, 
which at times seems to be the antithesis of the Essay, 
while to do the latter would have required a major revision 
of his sources of knowledge. However, in the absence of 
more satisfactory evidence to decide the case, we must 
abandon hope of finally settling the quastion. This 
admission does not destroy the value of his polemic against 
innate mental content. For despite the weaknesses of 
his empiricism, his atte,ck upon innate ideas will remain 
to many students of his Essay, "the most distinctive ana_ 
valuable part of Locke's teaching 112 by which 11 he did 
philosophy much service 11 • 3 
1. Aaron, JL, 119. 
2. Fowler, JL, 132. 
3. JvlcCosh, LTOK, 49-50. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The discussion in Chapter I is an attempt to 
answer the question; Was Locke atta.cking an accepted 
philosophical theory or was his attack aimed at the 
popular opinion of his day and was it thereby worth of 
the appellation "a straw man argument 11 ? 
It seems an inevitable conclusion of this analysis 
of the problem that Locke was, in the first place, attacking 
the theory of innate ideas and principles as it was under-
stood from the writings of Descartes. For this opinion 
the consensus of philosophers such as Regis, Gassendi, 
Leibniz, Voltaire, Santayana, Alexa.nder, and Fraser is 
submitted. 
The other facet of the problem is to determine 
whether this attack was justified by a philosophical 
theory held by a philosopher or a school of philosophy. 
It is shown that: ( 1) that Descartes 1 phraseology sometimes 
fell into ambiguities which left room for the impression 
that he held to the crude form of innate ideas (infants 
have tne notion of God), and as a result he was a.ttacked 
for holding the crude form by critics both before and 
after Locke 1 s day. ( 2) . that when he was charged with the 
crude form by Gassendi, he.did not consider it a strange 
or unfair accusation but used the theory himself in his 
reply. (3) Whether the problem resulted from a semantical 
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error or an incomplete philosophy on Descartes' part, 
will remain <m open quest ion, but in either case Locke 1 s 
attack was reasonable. (4) Without ac:·pealing to the crude 
form, it is beyond doubt that Descartes held to the more 
formal statement of innate principles (all men know the 
laws of logic innately) which theory Locke objected to 
on the grounds that self-evidence is all that need be 
attributed to them. Wherefore, if the crude form cannot 
be found in Descartes, but in another antagonist, e.g., 
the Cartesians, still Locke had grounds for the second 
aspect of the polemic in Descartes' forma.l statement of 
innate principles. ( 5) Locke spent many years with 
Gassendi and certain Cartesians and sat in on the debates 
which schooled him well in their theories, consequently 
with his fidelity to facts (Fraser's oft repeated words) 
it is difficult to believe that he would misrepresent 
their systems by setting up, as theirs, an exaggerated 
and unfair theory. Therefore, we conclude that, in the 
case of Descaxtes, at least, Locke could point to one 
who either held to the crude form of innate ideas early 
in his thinking and then modified it to the formal 
statement; or he always held to the formal statement, but 
made the mistake of writing in loose phraseology which 
sounded like the crude form. liiiswritings caught the 
eye of a variety of philosophers and gave them the occasion 
for attacking him as a teacher of the crude form of 
innate ideas. In addition, the Cartesians have been pointed 
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out unhesitatingly by numerous critics as being in the 
mind of Locke while he wrote his polemic. Leibniz, 
Voltaire, Gibson end Aaron ascribe the crude form to the 
Cartesians. Then there were the Cambridge Platonists, 
the University teachers (Scholastics), s.nd Lord Herbert; 
many of whom held to either the crude form or formal 
statement of innate ideas or both according to the testi-
mony of Webb, Gibson, Fowler and Aaron. These and possibly 
others provided a. sufficient basis for Locke 1 s two-fold 
polemic. On the basis of this evidence, the charge that 
Locke fought a straw-man in his attack upon Innate Ideas 
must be rejected. 
Chapter II is an analysis of the objections charged 
aga.inst Locke 1 s polemic. The tnree major critics of the 
polemic were Shaftesbury, Lee, and Leibniz. The first 
objection of Shaftesbury, that the birth and progress of 
the foetus is irrelevant to the problem of the acquisition 
of knowledge, is answered by the argument that Creation 
e.nd Pre-existence theories of the soul were important 
questions in that day. His second objection, that man 
comes to the knowledge of certain truths later, is answered 
by the observation that this is self-evidence, not innate 
knowledge. His third objection, that the ideas of order and 
administration of God infallibly and necessarily spring up in 
consciousness with adulthood, is answered by the observation 
that experience disproves this theory. The objection of Lee, 
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that no one held to Innate Ideas in the form Locke attacked, 
is ruled out by the evidence of Fowler concerning Lord 
Herbert, who did hold to the theory which Locke attacked 
(Cf. Summary of Chapter I of this thesis). The second 
obJection of Lee, that innateness comprehends all perception 
and knowledge, is answered by the observation that this 
would improperly place moral laws on an equal footing with 
the laws of logic by reason of their innateness. The 
first objection of Leibniz, that all the ideas and princi-
ples of the mind are innate, is answered by the comment 
that we should then abandon the word 1 innate 1 and use 
the word 'potential', but a potential idea is no idea. 
To his seco~d objection that there is a distinction between 
intellectual ideas, which originate in the senses and 
necessary truths (innate), which originate in the mind, 
the answer is made that this is a superficial distinction, 
for both are in the mind. To his third contention that 
innate ideas are necessary truths, the answer is given 
that this is self-evidence not innateness. The final 
contention of Leibniz, the.t innate ideas are first 
principles, is answered by the comment that he inconsis-
tently identifies the psychological and the logical in 
apperception, end then separates them in the sub-conscious. 
Therefore, it is concluded that Locke's polemic is unimpaired 
by his critics. 
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The burden of Chapter III is to answer the question: 
Is it possible to have logical necessity (self-evidence 
in Locke's terminology) without innate knowledge? It 
we.s pointed out tha.t it is possible for the following 
reasons: first, the two are not synonymous (for if they 
were, then all geometric axioms, mathematical maxims, 
natural philosophy, and all other sciences must be innate, 
much of which most men are ignorant); second, classifying 
logically necessary truths as self-evident does as much 
for them as calling them innate, and in addition, it avoids 
the awkward implication of stocking the mind with pre-experi-
ential da~a: th1rll.,llilolding to logical necessity permits 
one to claim innate intelligence, witil.out innate knowledge 
which is a misnomer. Locke could thus assume throughout 
the Essay that the mind has inherent faculties which it 
brings into the world with it, which he does, according 
to the testimony of many including Gibson, Aaron, and 
Fraser. It is finally concluded that to charge Locke with 
destroying innate intelligence, because he destroyed innate 
knowledge, is an unwarranted conclusion. However to criti-
cize Locke for failing properly to analyze the innate 
intelligence, is legitimate. 
Chapter IV deals With the problem of Certainty 
and answers the question, Can there be certainty without 
innate ideas? The first part of the chapter is a defense 
of the limitation which Locke put upon certain knowledge, 
for he observed the extremes to which philosophers ha.d 
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pushed their claims of certainty and rebelled against 
them. He divided 1knowledge 1 into certainty, which he 
called ~nowledge; and probability, which he called opinion, 
belief, and assent. For tnis he is commended. However, 
in the second part of the chapter he is criticized for 
over .stepping the bounds of his own definition of knowledge 
and attempting to prove the existence of God and ~nowledge 
of external objects to be certain ~owledge. This is not 
a failure of his polemic, but his Empiricism, which is 
not within the scope of this thesis. This thesis is 
concerned with the answer to the question, Can there be 
certainty without innate ideas? The answer is as follows: 
to ask the quest ion, Ca.n there be certainty without innate 
ideas? is begging the question, for the prior question is, 
Can there be certainty? To which the proper answer is, 
Not in the areas wnere the proponents of innate ideas 
looked for certainty, for there is no such thing. Conse-
quently Loc~e 1 s theory of Innate Ideas is not overthrown 
by the problem of certainty, but rather his theory was of 
marked value in understanding certainty properly. 
The fina.l chapter of this thesis (V) is a considera-
tion of the question, How can Loc~e account for the ideas 
of Substance, Infinity, and Cause end Effect which are in 
the mind of man? Locke 1 s analysis of these ideas results 
in conclusion that (1) these are products of sensation 
and reflection and not innate knowledge, and (2) tney are 
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negative ideas built up from other ideas, for we have 
no clear e.nd positive idea of them. This being the case, 
they ce.nnot be claimed to be innate, and once more Locke 1 s 
polemic stands its ground, unmarked by the impingement 
of its adversaries. 
In summary, the following conclusions have been 
reached: (1) It wa.s customary in Locke 1 s day for certa.in 
philosophers to speak of the mind as containing ideas and 
principles (from Plato) and theologians (Rome.n and 
Anglican) to speak of ~he mind as being 'loaded' (from 
Aquinas) or to speak of the mind as being 1 stamped 1 (from 
Augustine) with ideas from its beginning. (2) This was 
taken for granted to mean either actuel knowledge or latent 
knowledge, prior to sensory experience. (3) Locke attacked 
this doctrine in both forms. (4) What was called 'innate 1 
was no more than self-evident and necessary to rationality. 
(5) Locke's polemic was justified in both forms. (6) While 
stripping the mind of pre-sensory mental content and 
latent knowledge, Locke was still affirming the faculty 
of knowing, capacity for knowing, oL·rational structure 
of' the mind. (7) He failed properly to delimit what he 
meant by tLis innate capacity. (8) This failure did not 
invalidate his polemic. (9) His contribution to the 
proper definition of certainty was not sufficient. (10) 
This weakness of his empiricism did not hurt his polemic. 
(11) Hie theeis--wha.t the mind of men is not conscious of 
100 
is not knowledge is accepted as a statement of fact, by 




Note: Rand claimed (1931) that his text was the original 
draft of the Essay, but Aaron & Gibb (1936) publish-
ed an earlier draft which they called Draft A, Rand's 
they called Draft B. These appear here as ECHU-A 
and ECHU-B. References to Fraser's edition may be 
confusing for he excluded the introduction from Book 
I following Coste's French edition (1700). This 
makes all Fraser's Book I chapter numbers one less 
than other editions. 
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From the year in which John Locke 1 s volume, An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding was published (1690), 
to the present time his theory of Innate Ideas he.s 
received both praise and criticism, some of which, in 
each esse wa.s justified and some unwarranted. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to defend Locke 1 s 
theory of Innate Ideas against such extreme criticisms 
as "Locke 1s polemic is a straw man argument 11 , 11 No man in 
his right mindever claimed ideas to be innate in the sense 
which Locke attacks them 11 , and "Locke destroyed innate 
intelligence with his polemic 11 • 
In the pursuance of this purpose, Locke 1 s polemic 
is analyzed on three bs.ses. First, the validity of his 
argument13, which are that: (1) There are no propositions, 
either speculative or practical, which are consciously 
received as true by every being at birth; (2) nor by 
s.ll in whom reason is developed. (3) 'fo suppose aught to 
be innate in the mind, of which that mind is unconscious, 
involves a contradiction. (4) T.:;at although knowledge, 
"I'Ihen formed, is found to involve self-evident principles, 
their self-evidence does not prove (but rs.ther disproves) 
their innateness. (5) The hypothesis of their innateness 
is unnecessary, as the actual steps to knowledge and assent 
can be proved not to depend on our being born with a cons-
cousness of the meaning and truth of any alleged innate 
(1) 
principles. Moreover there could be no innate principles 
without innate ideas; but our ideas of identity, quality, 
substance, ;:~nd God, which (if any) must be innate, are 
plainly dependent on experience. Second, the motives of 
his polemic which are: (1) Innate ideas give a false 
account of the nature a.nd source of certainty. (2) They 
served as an encouragement to the lazy acauiescence in the 
opinions of others. And (3) they are contrary to experience. 
Third, the objects of his polemic are determined to be 
(1) Descartes, because (i) his loose phraseology left 
room for the crude form of innate ideas which produced 
criticism both before and after Locke's time, (ii) when 
charged with holding to the crude form by Gassendi, he 
defended it, (iii) that without appealing to the crude 
form, Descartes left himself open to the polemic by holding 
to latent innate knowledge, and (iv) Locke spent many 
years in the compa.ny of certain Cartesians and it is dollbt-
flll that he wollld misrepresent their position; (2) certa.in 
Cartesians, who held to both the crllde and formal theories 
according to the testimony of Fraser, Leibniz, Voltaire, 
Gibson, and Aaron; (3) the Cambridge Platonists a.lso held 
to both the crt1de and formal theories according to the 
testimony of \llebb; and (4) certain University teachers 
according to the testimony of Gibson, Rand, Aaron. 
Therefore, it is conclllded that Locke's polemic against 
Innate Ideas was justified, since there was Sllfficient 
(2) 
ground in any of fowr 'schools' of thou~ht to warrant his 
attack upon Innate Ideas in both the crude form, e.g., 
being conscious at birth of the existence of God; and the 
formal statement, e.g., having latent knowledge of the 
law of contraCiction. 
The argument of the thesis then twrns to an 
evaluation of the objections urged against the polemic 
by Locke's three major critics. The first critic under 
consideration is Lord Shaftesbury. He objected (1) that 
the birth and progress vf the foetus is irrelevant to 
the problem of the acquisition of kn01dedge, (2) that man 
comes to the knowledge of certain truths, which are innate, 
later on, and (3) that the idea.s of order and administra-
tion of God infallibly and necessarily spring up in cons-
ciousness with adulthood. These are answered by tne 
following arguments (1) Creation and Pre-existence theories 
of the soul were important questions in that day, (2) 
the knowledge which man acquires in adulthood, is indica-
tive of logical necessity, not innateness, and (3) experi-
ence proves the opposite to be true in many cases. The 
second critic is Lee who objected (1) tnat Locke had 
no adversary, for no one held to innate ideas as ne attacked 
them, and (2) the proper definition of innateness is that 
which comprehends all perception and knowledge. These 
a.rguments are inva.lidated by (1) the evidence of Fowler 
concerning the teaching of Lord Herbert (Cf. Chapter II 
of this thesis), and (2) the answer that Lee inadvertently 
(0) 
placed moral laws on an equal footing with the laws of 
logic by his definition of innateness. The third eritic 
is Leibniz who objected (1) that all the ideas and princi-
ples of the mind are innate, (2) that there is a distinction 
between intellectual ideas which originate in sense, and 
necessary truths, which originate in the mind, (3) that 
innate ideas are necessary truth, and (4) that innate 
ideas are first principles. These are answered by the 
follo'loring considerations: ( 1) then we are talking about 
'potential knowledge' not 1 inna.te knowledge', (2) the 
distinction is in name only for they are both in the mind, 
(3) self-evidence is not the criterion for innateness, 
and (4) this is inconsistent for he hes identified the 
psychological and logical in apperception while he separates 
them in the sub-conscious. Therefore, it is concluded 
that Locke's polemic withstands the criticisms urged 
against it. 
The thesis now turns to a defense of the polemic 
in the area of the problems raised as a result of the 
rejection of innate ideas. The first under consideration 
is, Can Locke consistently reject innate ideas and appeal 
. -
to self-evidence or logical necessity? It is concluded 
that it is possible to hold to logical necessity without 
innate ideas because (1) the two are not synonymous 
and (2) innate ideas a.nd innate intelligence are not 
synonymous. The second problem is concerned with certainty 
(4) 
and askes the question, Can Locke claim any certainty 
without innate ideas? The answer arrived at is that (1) 
too much certainty had been claimed in the p;. st and that 
Locke wisely rejected the extravs.gant claims of the 
Cartesians and others, (2) there can be certainty on the 
basis of logical necessity without innate ideas, and (~) 
Locke unfortuna.tely could not extricate himself from the 
desire for certainty and inconsistently sought to prove it 
... 
in the realm of the knowledge of God and of external objects. 
This, however, is a weQkness of his empiricism, not his 
polemic. The third problem may also be stated in question 
form as follows: How can Locke account for the ideas in 
the mind of man such as Substance, Inf'ini ty, and Cs.use 
and Effect? The anser is that these are all negative 
ideas, for we i1ave no clear idea of them. Since. they are 
negative ideas, built up from other ideas, they cannot 
be considered to be innate, for if they were we would have 
clear ideas of them. Therefore, again it must be confessed 
that Locke's polemic withstands the criticisms brought 
age.inst it and stc.nds today a monument to the emancipation 
of the mind of man from the theory of inborn ideas and 
principles, whether conscious or unconscious, which held 
sway over most theological, philosophical, academic, and 
popular though from the time of Plato to Locke, and 
acted as a block in the way of the sdvs.nce of reason, 
( 5) 
